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## USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 1, January 1981

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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On behalf of all of us in FBIS I wish to express appreciation to our readers who have guided our efforts throughout the years.

4 March 1981

# USSR REPORT

## USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 1, January 1981

Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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## ENTERING THE YEAR OF 1981, THE YEAR OF THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 3-7

[Text] The year of 1981 will begin with the truly internationally historic event of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a party guiding the destiny of a gigantic multinational state and exerting increasingly perceptible influence on the destiny of the entire world; a state whose main concern is struggle for the preservation of peace on earth, for the constant enhancement of the standard of living and quality of life of its own people, and for the creation of conditions for economic and social progress everywhere. There is no question that the results of the 26th CPSU Congress will represent a new and sizable contribution to this titanic struggle. People throughout the world are keeping a watchful eye on our party's preparations for the congress and are engaging in extensive and thorough study of the "Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and the Period up to 1990," a document drafted by the CPSU Central Committee for submission to the 26th party congress, published at the time of the preparations for the congress and presented for nationwide discussion.

The CPSU Central Committee's draft plan is a document of tremendous theoretical and practical significance. It contains creative summarization of the practice of communist construction in the USSR, it considers the experience of other socialist countries and it embodies the strategy and tactics of the CPSU in regard to major aspects of the economic, social and spiritual development of the nation of soviets with a view to the specific conditions of the 1980's.

"Each congress," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, said at the June (1980) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "has revealed new horizons to our party and nation. We are certain that this will also be true of the coming congress, which is expected to define the strategy and tactics of struggle in the coming stage of communist construction."

The draft plan of the CPSU Central Committee sets new and distant frontiers for our continued progress.

For example, national income was 400 billion rubles greater in the Tenth Five-Year Plan than in the Ninth, the industrial product was 717 billion rubles greater and the agricultural product was 50 billion rubles greater. More than 1,200 large

industrial enterprises were opened for operations. The output of consumer goods increased 21 percent, including a 41-percent increase in goods for cultural and household needs. The assortment of these goods was broadened and their quality was improved.

The party's agrarian policy has been consistently implemented and has increased agricultural production. The gross annual grain yield in the 5 years exceeded 200 million tons for the first time. The output of meat, milk, eggs, cotton and other products was augmented.

A new and sizable step was taken in the resolution of social problems. During the 5 years, national income used to elevate the public standard of living exceeded the figure of the Ninth Five-Year Plan by 329 billion rubles. Real per capita income rose 17 percent. The average wage of workers and employees rose more than 15 percent and the income derived by kolkhoz members from public farming rose 26 percent.

The CPSU Central Committee document attaches particular significance to the development of science and technology, which is to be focused even more on the resolution of the most urgent problems connected with the continued progress of Soviet society and the acceleration of the economy's move toward intensification.

The draft plan of the CPSU Central Committee envisages the further development of our entire economy. National income used for consumption and accumulation will rise 18-20 percent in the next 5 years.

Industrial production will increase 26-28 percent, including an increase of 26-28 percent for the means of production, and an increase of 27-29 percent for consumer items. The scales of industrial production growth are also attested to by the following figures. In 1985 the output of electric energy will total 1,550-1,600 billion kilowatt-hours, the output of petroleum, including gas condensates, will amount to 620-645 million tons, the output of coal will total 770-800 million tons and the production of finished rolled ferrous metals will reach 117-120 million tons.

The draft plan of the CPSU Central Committee contains a detailed description of the development of the agroindustrial complex, the main purpose of which will be the reliable provision of the nation with food and agricultural raw materials.

On the whole, the results of the past 5 years indicate that the Soviet nation has progressed in all areas of economic and social development. Accomplishments in economic and social development will simplify the performance of even more sizable tasks. It is these tasks that are defined in the CPSU Central Committee draft.

The coming decade, the draft says, will become a new and important stage in the creation of a material and technical base for communism and in the development of social relations.

In the 1980's the communist party will consistently adhere to its economic strategy, the chief goal of which is a constant rise in the material and cultural living standard of the people and the creation of better conditions for the all-round

development of each individual by means of the continued enhancement of the effectiveness of all social production, the augmentation of labor productivity and the stimulation of the social and labor enthusiasm of the Soviet people.

The policy and militaristic activity of the largest capitalist power, the United States, serve as a sharp contrast to the peaceful constructive activity of the first socialist state in the world. It is a well-known fact that this policy and activity has once again raised international tension to a dangerous level, although even the most fleeting glance at the entire history of contemporary international relations leads unavoidably to the conclusion that the escalation of international tension and the arms race has never benefited a single country or a single group of people in any way whatsoever. Besides this, it has never led to the attainment of a single political or economic objective set by the initiators of this kind of policy.

Let us consider the results of the speech Winston Churchill made in Fulton, in the presence of then American President Harry Truman. It marked the beginning of unconcealed "cold war," which was supposed to guarantee, as Churchill then phrased it, Anglo-Saxon leadership of the world. This prominent statesman voiced widely differing views on problems of war and peace at different times. After the October Revolution in Russia, his advice was "to smother Bolshevism in the cradle." Attempts were made to implement this advice by such means as armed intervention by all of the main imperialist powers, including the United States, against the young Soviet republic. The interventionists had to clear out. This republic, fatigued by war, hunger and destruction, grew into the powerful Soviet Union, and it did this in spite of all types of economic and political blockades and the policy of creating a so-called cordon sanitaire around the world's first socialist country. What is more, later events forced the United States and Britain to cooperate closely with the Soviet Union to cleanse our planet of the plague of German fascism. At the time of the historic struggle against the brown menace, in which the USSR played the deciding role, the same Churchill made numerous references to the vital need for the closest possible cooperation between the Western countries and the Soviet Union.

The cold war was started for the purpose of establishing so-called Anglo-Saxon law and order in the world, radically undermining the liberation movement of people in the colonial countries, repartitioning the world, preserving and consolidating the British empire and creating a new empire--an American one. Where are these empires now?

The policy of militarism, the exacerbation of tension and the escalation of the arms race have led only to a multitude of so-called minor wars and the senseless squandering of the human and material resources of the United States and many other countries.

One of the main results of this policy was the creation of the NATO military-political bloc in 1949 under the leadership of the United States. Many people in the world, especially the Americans themselves, thought that this nation would remain the strongest power forever. The Soviet Union was warning even then that the policy of dividing the world into military-political blocs could be dangerous in many ways, primarily because it could turn the cold war into a hot war.



Washington and the other Western capitals did not listen to these warnings and continued to arm themselves to the teeth, without concealing the goals of the arms race: To keep the Soviet Union and other countries in a state of fear and to undermine the Soviet economy with the aid of this race.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which not only survived, but even continued to develop successfully, had to take reciprocal measures and create the defensive Warsaw Pact organization in 1955--it should be stressed that this was 6 years after NATO's founding. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy never relaxed in its effort to show the world the full recklessness and danger of the policy of dividing the world into military-political blocs. Moscow consistently and repeatedly proposed the start of negotiations with the aim of establishing the proper atmosphere for the dissolution of both groups--NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Finally, at the beginning of the 1970's, under the pressure of circumstances Washington seemed to realize the falsity and danger of cold war dogmas and the policy of confrontation and acknowledged the irreversibility of the change in the global balance of power. Never before in the history of international relations have so many far-reaching agreements aimed at strengthening the cause of peace been concluded so quickly as between the USSR and the United States at that time. In particular, the two countries acknowledged the need to promote detente in every way possible and to gradually supplement it with military detente.

Now our planet has had to return to the cold war era in many spheres, and it is Washington's fault. Extensive coverage has been given to the Carter Administration's announced intentions to achieve military superiority for the United States over the Soviet Union, although Washington once admitted that the preservation of strategic parity and equivalent security between the USSR and the United States is essential to the cause of peace.

This has been accompanied by the resumption of a campaign aimed not only at strengthening NATO, but also at expanding this military-political bloc and, what is more, at creating new military-political blocs under the aegis of the United States in various parts of the world, especially the Near and Middle East. Spain is literally being dragged by the hair into NATO. France is being urged to return to the NATO military organization. Greece has already returned.

This policy could lead to the further exacerbation of tension and to more and more new military expenditures. In the final analysis, it could result in the permanent division of the world into hostile groups of states, with all of the attending consequences.

The year of 1981 marks the beginning of the actual work of the new Republican Administration in the United States, headed by Ronald Reagan. Much in the world will depend on the policy of this administration. Aggressive groups in the United States are already trying to force the new administration to launch a frontal attack on detente and wreck the efforts to consolidate peace on earth by escalating the arms race, "legalizing" "limited" nuclear war, and openly interfering in the affairs of other countries. They want the administration to take a more rigid position in relations with the Soviet Union and the developing countries and make more of an effort to achieve military superiority and make the United States the "unquestioned leader" in world affairs.

Sober voices can also be heard in the United States. Their advice is to focus attention on economic and social problems within the nation, which became unprecedently acute during the years of the Carter Administration that was rejected by the voters. They are demanding that Washington return to a sensible and realistic approach in the area of foreign policy, help to stop the race for nuclear arms and renounce its frenzied anti-Sovietism and its habit of playing the "China card," which is so dangerous to the cause of peace throughout the world.

The USSR and the other nations of the socialist community have never attempted to achieve military superiority. They have never had any strategic doctrine that has not been defensive. "The foreign policy of our country," L. I. Brezhnev recently reiterated quite unequivocally, "is a simple and honest policy of peace that is not directed against any third party. We are not trespassing on anyone else's land or interfering in anyone else's internal affairs. But we will always stand up for our rights and legitimate interests."

The love of peace is an integral feature of the foreign policy of socialism, as a social order in which no one has an interest in the war between the classes. A world without war, V. I. Lenin said, is the socialist ideal.

The USSR has done much to attain this ideal. The Soviet Union and the socialist community have always led, and will continue to lead, the struggle for international security. The specific concerns of the socialist countries are attested to by several initiatives set forth by them in the past year. They include the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee's proposal of a summit meeting by the heads of states in all parts of the world to discuss problems connected with the eradication of sources of international tension and the prevention of war. They also include measures pertaining to disarmament, the limitation of the arms race and the consolidation of peace in Europe and the rest of the world, as set forth in a declaration adopted by the same committee. They include Soviet initiatives regarding talks on the limitation of the nuclear arms race in Europe. They include the recently completed withdrawal of 20,000 servicemen, 1,000 tanks and other military equipment from the GDR by the Soviet Union. Several new, far-reaching initiatives were also set forth by the Soviet Union at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly.

Once again, the contrast is literally blinding: On the days when this session met, the United States and other NATO powers announced their decision to augment military activity right up to the end of the 20th century.

A report on a meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Moscow on 6 December 1980 provided new and weighty evidence of the willingness and determination of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community to defend the cause of peace. During the course of this meeting, participants announced their satisfaction with the more active political context between states with differing social structures, the continuation of the dialog on major international problems, and the UN General Assembly's productive discussion of the proposals of socialist and other countries aimed at the immediate institution of effective measures to limit and stop the arms race.

The socialist countries, the report stated, have declared their intention to continue working toward the improvement of the international climate, adherence to the policy of detente, the development of international cooperation and the resolution of all conflicts by means of negotiations.



The participants in the meeting stressed their belief in cooperation with all progressive, democratic, anti-imperialist forces, in the stronger solidarity of all people in the struggle against the threat of war, in the policy of peace and disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and in detente and egalitarian cooperation.

Participants expressed their willingness to work constructively toward the development of relations with the United States of America if the same approach should be displayed by the new American administration.

The countries represented at the meeting applaud the beginning of the Madrid Conference's work and hope that its development will afford new opportunities for the implementation of the Helsinki documents and for lasting peace on the continent.

The participants also agreed, however, that the atmosphere in the world is still tense. The arms race is becoming increasingly dangerous. Centers of potential military confrontation and tension exist in various regions. New conflicts are erupting. The present situation calls for heightened vigilance in regard to the aggressive ambitions of imperialist forces and the attempts of reactionary forces to damage the positions of the socialist countries, the developing states and the national liberation movement.

Participants expressed their certainty that the united efforts of all countries and people interested in peace, security and international cooperation can establish detente as the leading tendency in international development.

"The task of accomplishing the transition from confrontation to dialog, from the exacerbation of conflicts to their resolution is certainly not a simple one, but it is essential," L. I. Brezhnev stressed in a speech in New Dehli during a friendly visit to India in December 1980. "This can only be accomplished collectively, through the efforts of those who want peace and are working toward peace. In our opinion, it is precisely this that should be regarded as the chief criterion in assessing the foreign policy of states."

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## DISARMAMENT IS THE IMPERATIVE OF OUR TIME

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 8-18

[Article by V. L. Israelyan and Ye. V. Israelyan: "The USSR's Struggle for a Ban on Radiological Weapons"]

[Text] Now that the world situation is being complicated by the actions of U.S. imperialism and NATO militaristic circles and their policy of building up weapon supplies, the need to curb the arms race and to stop it completely is the most urgent international issue of the day. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are consistently waging a struggle to reduce the danger of war and achieve real progress in the sphere of disarmament.

In the last decade the USSR has been guided in its practical activity by the Program of Peace, set forth at the 24th CPSU Congress, and the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples, adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress. These party documents stipulate the basic guidelines of the struggle to stop the arms race.

The 25th CPSU Congress recognized the conclusion of an international treaty prohibiting the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction as a primary objective.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Union believes that a ban on radiological weapons would serve as part of the solution to the problem of the comprehensive ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. This could be another important contribution to the cause of arms race limitation and the delivery of mankind from the danger of the creation and use of one of the possible new types of weapons of mass destruction. This would be a serious step toward the avoidance of the use of technological progress in the creation of new types of weapons.

The intensification of military research has led to the development and production of more and more new types and systems of weapons. Many of them, which made their appearance in the stockpiles of states only 5-10 years ago, are already considered to be obsolete and are being replaced with more highly perfected models. Science and technology are developing so quickly that, unless the necessary steps are taken, the creation of new types and systems of weapons could not only afford opportunities for the development of cheaper but more destructive types of weapons, but also permit the circumvention of existing restrictions, such as those, for example, in the area of strategic weapons, the ban on bacteriological weapons, and so forth.

The conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as an important element of the struggle to curtail the arms race, was first proposed in L. I. Brezhnev's speech to the voters of Bauminakiy Electoral District in Moscow in June 1975. "The level of science and technology today is such that," L. I. Brezhnev said, "there is the serious danger that a weapon even more horrifying than nuclear weapons could be developed. The human intelligence and conscience dictate the need to set up an insurmountable obstacle to prevent this kind of weapon from making its appearance."<sup>2</sup>

On the initiative of the USSR, the agenda of the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1975 included the topic of a "ban on the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons." The Soviet Union also submitted a draft international agreement on this matter to the assembly for discussion.<sup>3</sup> The assembly passed a resolution which contained the request that the Disarmament Commission begin work as quickly as possible on the compilation of the appropriate text with the aid of qualified government experts.

In accordance with the resolution of the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission began to investigate the question of this ban in spring 1976. At that time, however, spokesmen for the Western countries essentially declined to state their views. They limited themselves to complaints about the uncertain scales of the ban, implied that the proposed agreement could have a negative effect on the development of science for peaceful purposes, and so forth.

During the summer session of 1976, the Disarmament Commission's work on the ban was somewhat energized. This was largely due to a working document submitted by the Soviet Union. It defined the concepts of the new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and clarified and amplified the Soviet position on this matter.

In 1977 the Soviet delegation submitted a supplementary draft agreement to the Disarmament Commission. It reflected the comments and proposals that were made when the matter was discussed at the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly and in the Disarmament Commission by various delegations. In particular, it took into account the opinion that it would be expedient to use the formulas of the UN Commission on Conventional Weapons (1948) in the definition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Article 1 of the revised Soviet draft of the future agreement stated: "New types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction include weapons which might be developed in the future on the basis either of presently known scientific and technical principles that have not been used as yet, either separately or collectively, for the creation of weapons of mass destruction, or of scientific and technical principles that might be discovered in the future and possess properties identical to, or stronger than, those of existing weapons of mass destruction in terms of destructive force."<sup>4</sup>

This definition, besides being precise and comprehensive, also adheres as closely as possible to the 1948 formula, on which there was already wide agreement. The discussion of the Soviet initiative in the United Nations and in the Disarmament Commission proved, however, that the Western countries did not intend, at least not in the near future, to consider the conclusion of an international agreement on a total ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, although there was no shortage of declarations, unsupported by deeds, of their agreement,

in principle, with the goals of the ban. At the same time the United States and some other Western countries stated their willingness to discuss the prohibition of some specific type of weapon of mass destruction. At the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly in 1976, the American delegation named one such type-- radiological weapons.

Although the Soviet Union was a confirmed and consistent supporter of a total ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, it did not exclude the possibility of separate agreements on specific types of weapons. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union agreed to bilateral talks with the United States in 1977 on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, in this context, a ban on radiological weapons.

Radiological weapons were first mentioned in various publications soon after the end of World War II. After analyzing the results of the atomic weapons used by the United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the UN Commission on Conventional Weapons classified weapons "in which radioactive substances are used" as one type of weapon of mass destruction in 1948.

Although the ban on radiological weapons was not a specific item on the Disarmament Commission's agenda, in 1970 it began to be discussed within the context of other aspects of arms limitation and disarmament. The most diverse points of view were expressed, including those which deny the very possibility of the development of such weapons. The Dutch delegate, for example, stated that radiological weapons seemed too impractical, since the extensive production of material with a short decomposition period and its delivery to the battlefield would be too burdensome in wartime. In his opinion, each country's need to protect its own troops from the effects of radiological weapons would diminish the probability of the use of such weapons even more, particularly as there were already many other types of weapons which could put the enemy's personnel and equipment out of commission by much more simple means. The delegation of some other countries noted that the lack of experience in the use of these weapons made all of the talk about their properties extremely hypothetical and that the danger of their use had been highly exaggerated.<sup>5</sup>

Now, however, experts believe that a solid basis exists for the development and use of radiological weapons, and that the difficulties pointed out by some delegations regarding the development and use of radiological weapons date back to the first postwar years and do not apply to the present day. Materials with a longer half-life can now be used in the development of radiological weapons. For example, when Strontium-90, with a half-life of around 28 years, enters the organism, it is retained in the bones for an extremely long time. Experiments with animals have demonstrated that certain quantities of this substance can cause anemia, osteonecrosis and cancer. In addition to this isotope, there are many other radioactive materials with a half-life of a few weeks, months or years, which are seriously dangerous to people by virtue of their high degree of radioactivity. There is every reason to believe that the destructive effects of radiological weapons would be similar to the effects of the radioactive materials that are created in nuclear explosions and result in the radioactive destruction of the explosion site.



Radioactive materials could be used with the aid of various delivery vehicles. In particular, these could include airborne bombs, artillery shells, mines and torpedoes, which would spread the radioactive substance they contained by means of an explosion, and special devices or equipment for the spread of radioactive materials by non-explosive means, particularly the dispersion of liquid or solid particles of these materials.

The danger of the use of radiological weapons is compounded by the difficulty of detecting radioactive substances. Their presence in the environment can only be detected with the aid of physical instruments recording the emissions of materials. The eradication of the aftereffects of the use of radiological weapons also represents an extremely complex problem, as the deactivation and disposal of radioactive materials would require specially trained personnel and the proper equipment.

The rapid development of nuclear power engineering in many countries, however, is establishing objective conditions for the proliferation of radioactive materials that could be used in radiological weapons. When the by-products of nuclear power plants are being processed, radioactive substances could be isolated and accumulated not only for peaceful purposes but also for use in radiological weapons. It is obvious, therefore, that progress in nuclear power engineering establishes a material base for the birth of radiological weapons. Besides this, radioactive materials can also be derived by another method, based on the radiation of certain chemical elements with an intensive neutron current. In essence, any nuclear power reactor, regardless of its designated purpose and design, is a potential source of sizable quantities of radioactive materials. Any state, regardless of whether it does or does not possess nuclear weapons, could produce radiological weapons.

Of course, we cannot deny that it would still be a problem to produce, handle and deliver radioactive materials. It appears, however, that the problem could now be solved much more easily than 20 or even 10 years ago due to the rapid development of nuclear power engineering and the appearance of new and improved delivery vehicles. In recent years our knowledge of the possibilities for the development of radiological weapons has become more complete and comprehensive. As early as August 1977, a long list of radioactive materials which could be used in radiological weapons was presented to the Disarmament Commission by a Bulgarian expert. Given the present development of technology, this document states, radioactive materials with the necessary properties for use in combat could be used for destructive purposes in solid, liquid and even gaseous form.

It should be noted, however, that radiological weapons could serve as more than a means of waging war; they could also be used as instruments of diversion in peacetime--for example, border rivers could be polluted with radioactive materials produced by nuclear power reactors, or these materials could be scattered on the territory of a neighboring state by various means.

Therefore, radiological weapons are quite definitely among the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction and it is completely possible that they could be developed in our day.

During the course of several rounds of Soviet-American talks, which ended successfully in summer 1979, the two sides thoroughly considered, with the aid of qualified experts, all aspects of the problem of banning radiological weapons and

submitted their drafts of an international agreement on this matter. At a meeting in Vienna in June 1979, the leaders of the USSR and United States happily confirmed that the sides had reached agreement on the basic provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, accumulation and use of radiological weapons. On 10 July 1979, the Soviet and U.S. delegations submitted a joint proposal on this matter to the Disarmament Commission for its further examination and discussion.<sup>6</sup>

The first provisions of the draft treaty define the scope and target of the ban. The obligations that would be taken on by signatories to the treaty will completely exclude the possibility of the deliberate use of any radioactive material not produced by a nuclear explosive device as a weapon of mass destruction. Article 1 of the draft treaty states that "each signatory pledges to not develop, not produce, not accumulate by any means, not acquire, not possess and not use radiological weapons."<sup>7</sup>

In Article 2 the "radiological weapon" is defined as "any technical device, including any weapon or piece of equipment that is not a nuclear explosive device, specifically designated to spread radioactive material for the purpose of destruction, harm or injury by means of the radioactive emissions produced by the decomposition of such material."<sup>8</sup>

Since the draft treaty refers to radiological weapons, it does not apply to nuclear explosive devices and the radioactive material produced by their explosion--that is, it does not apply to nuclear weapons.

When the joint Soviet-American proposal regarding the ban on radiological weapons was submitted, the U.S. representative made a statement, stressing that all nuclear explosive devices which produce radioactive materials or any other substances that might be used for destructive or injurious purposes, constitute a category of weapons of mass destruction that differs from radiological weapons and is therefore not covered by the ban.

The draft treaty includes a pledge by the signatories to not assist, encourage or induce any individual, state, group of states or international organization to engage in any activity prohibited by the treaty.

The signatories would also pledge to take any steps they deem necessary, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, to prevent the loss of radioactive materials that could be used in the development of radiological weapons and to prohibit and prevent the use of these materials for this purpose.

The ban on radiological weapons does not in any way restrict the use of radioactive materials in various fields of technology, industry, agriculture and medicine for peaceful purposes. One article of the draft stresses the right of signatories to engage in unlimited peaceful activity in this area: "The provisions of this treaty will not impede the peaceful use of sources of radioactive emissions from radioactive decomposition and will not contradict any of the universally recognized principles and standards of international law pertaining to this use."<sup>9</sup>

The text of the draft also envisages the procedure of withdrawing from the agreement. A state intending to do this must inform all other signatories and the UN Security Council 3 months in advance. It must state the exceptional circumstances it views as a threat to its higher interests.

This provision of the draft represents one means of preventing possible violations of the treaty, stresses the need to observe the security interests of all signatories and underscores the fact that the treaty applies to a potential means of mass destruction. The possibility of withdrawing from the agreement is also envisaged in those cases when violations of the conditions of the treaty threaten the interests of other signatories. This provision, as we know, is also present in many other agreements connected with arms limitation. This is why it is also present in this draft.

The definition of the term "radiological weapon" proposed in the draft treaty aroused great interest in the Disarmament Commission. A Dutch representative pointed out the fact that it refers to the non-explosive origins of radioactive materials. In his opinion, this reference implies some kind of loophole that would permit the use of the by-products of underground nuclear tests in these weapons. It is true that a complex, dangerous and costly process could be employed for the extraction of products which have been in the earth for a long time--that is, for many years after an explosion.

As we know, however, there is a much simpler method for the development of radiological weapons, based on the use of the waste products of nuclear reactors designated for peaceful purposes. In comparison, this method is so much simpler that the definition of the radiological weapon does not have to refer to any specific and virtually unrealistic method--namely, the use of the by-products of underground nuclear tests for purposes prohibited by the treaty. Nonetheless, even in this hypothetical case the use of radioactive material would be virtually impossible because the provisions of the treaty would ban all of the technical devices for the spread of radioactive substances. This is why the scope of the ban proposed in the draft completely excludes the possibility of the appearance of radiological weapons in the stockpiles of states. And the reference to the non-explosive origins of radioactive materials underscores the main distinction between radiological and nuclear weapons.

The article pertaining to control over the observance of treaty provisions corresponds to the principle in accordance with which the measures of verification envisaged in any arms limitation agreement must be consistent with the target and scope of the ban. This article was drafted with a view to the experience with existing agreements in the area of arms limitation and disarmament. It envisages consultation and cooperation by signatories in the resolution of any problems connected with the aims or fulfillment of the terms of the treaty. These consultations could be conducted within the framework of UN international organizations in accordance with the UN Charter or as conferences of a consultative committee of experts. The draft envisages that this committee will be convened by the depositary state within a month after the receipt of a request from any signatory.

The main function of this committee would be the clarification of actual circumstances in cases of doubts about the observance of treaty provisions. Any state which signs and ratifies the treaty would have the right to appoint an expert to the committee, with the depositary or his representative as the chairman. Each expert could request states and international organizations, through the committee chairman, to submit information or participate in the work of the committee.



The article pertaining to control over the observance of the treaty also envisages the right of signatories to submit complaints to the UN Security Council if the treaty provisions should be violated by any other signatories. Besides this, in order to guarantee an effective system for the verification of treaty observance, each signatory would pledge to cooperate in any Security Council investigation.

Therefore, it is clear that when the basic provisions of the treaty were drafted, the co-authors wanted to guarantee its reliability and give all signatories assurance that the new treaty would be a viable and effective means of arms limitation. It is in this spirit that they worded the provisions pertaining to the amendments of the treaty, the organization of conferences for the signatories to consider the impact of the treaty, and others. The text of the draft treaty specifies the right of each signatory to make amendments, which will go into effect after the documents pertaining to its adoption by the majority of states are filed with the depositary. The draft also specifies that a conference will be convened to examine the impact of the treaty every 10 years or less, and that all new technological achievements in this field will be taken into account at the time of this conference.

The draft treaty will not expire.

The new and important proposal to prohibit one type of weapon of mass destruction aroused interest and satisfaction in the Disarmament Commission. Many delegations applauded the agreement reached by the USSR and United States. The Indian, Japanese, Dutch, French and Australian delegations asked the co-authors of the proposed draft treaty several questions, and these were answered in detail with the aid of experts. For example, the Indian delegation, considering the possibility, of the development of radiological weapons to be completely realistic, asked the experts whether laboratory tests of these weapons had already been conducted and inquired as to the probability of their appearance in the near future. The co-authors of the proposal noted that although such tests had not been conducted as yet, the objective conditions for the development of such weapons do exist.

During the discussion of the Soviet-American proposal, questions of a legal nature were also considered. The representatives of some states expressed their misgivings with the fact that signatories were supposedly authorized to use radiological weapons on territory they control. Article 1 of the draft treaty, however, says nothing about the territorial limits of the ban. We can assume that these delegates found a contradiction between the all-encompassing nature of the ban and the following provision in Article 7: "Nothing in this treaty should be interpreted as something that limits or diminishes the obligations taken on by any state in accordance with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the protocol banning the wartime use of asphyxiating, toxic or other similar gases and bacteriological means, signed in Geneva on 17 June 1925, or any standard of international law regulating armed conflicts."<sup>10</sup>

Apparently, they were referring to the standards defined in the supplementary protocols to the Geneva conventions of 1949 on the protection of war victims. The first supplementary protocol does contain a provision which authorizes sides to defend their national territory in times of extreme military danger by destroying or damaging crops, irrigation equipment, food supplies and livestock on their own territory and thereby endanger the life of their own civilian population, forcing these civilians to evacuate. Several delegations insisted on the inclusion of

this point at the time of the diplomatic conference held in Geneva in 1974-1977 to discuss the enforcement and development of humane laws during periods of armed conflict. This provision in the supplementary protocol, however, does not in any way diminish the all-encompassing nature of the ban on radiological weapons. In the first place, this article does not apply to weapons, but to a specific method of warfare. In the second place, it cannot in any way regulate the use of radiological weapons which, as a potential method of mass destruction, would be used to annihilate hundreds of millions of people and inflict colossal damages, and not to defend territory.

Therefore, there are not sufficient grounds for misgivings about the fact that the proposed ban on radiological weapons would permit their use on the state's own territory.

In view of the fact that radiological weapons inflict damages with radioactive emissions, many delegates asked about the similarities and differences between these weapons and weapons of enhanced radiation, or, in other words, the neutron bomb. In this connection, they asked about the expediency of including a ban on neutron weapons within the proposed draft. The demand for a ban on neutron weapons was once again loudly voiced by many delegations in the Disarmament Commission.

Some delegates correctly pointed out the absence of a preamble to the draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. The Hungarian delegation submitted a draft preamble which stresses the final goal of all disarmament talks--total and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The preamble points out the importance of taking effective steps to prevent the use of scientific and technological achievements for the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including radiological weapons. It also points out the danger of the development and use of radiological weapons by the armed forces of states. It expresses the certainty that the prohibition of these weapons will assist in preserving the environment for present and future generations. It recognizes the need for the peaceful use of sources of radiation in various fields of human activity. The text of the preamble also refers to the UN General Assembly's appeal for a ban on the development, production, accumulation and use of radiological weapons. The Soviet Union agreed that the preamble was necessary and applauded the Hungarian initiative. Delegates from Hungary and the GDR also made several suggestions regarding the wording of the concluding statements of the treaty.

When the draft was being discussed, several delegates, including the Japanese representative, proposed that the text underscore the connection between the treaty on radiological weapons and measures to limit nuclear arms and stipulate its impact on future nuclear disarmament talks. Some delegates insisted on the compulsory signing of the radiological weapon ban treaty by all nuclear powers. Representatives of other countries--France and the Netherlands, for example--believed that participation by all states possessing nuclear weapons would not have to be envisaged because the development of radiological weapons would be connected with the progress of nuclear power engineering rather than with the existence of nuclear weapons.

The French representative described the exchange of opinions on radiological weapons as a useful discussion and pointed out the need for participation by experts in future discussions of the draft treaty, particularly when the list of isotopes suitable for use in radiological weapons is being drawn up. He announced France's willingness to participate in gatherings of experts for the discussion of this matter.<sup>11</sup> The Australian representative stressed that the drafting of a treaty banning radiological weapons deserves the most careful consideration and should be concluded before such weapons appear in the arsenals of states. The Australian delegate cited the example of the treaty on the Antarctic, signed in 1959, when no one had yet begun any military activity on this continent. He also declared Australia's intention to send its own experts to work on the consultative committee.<sup>12</sup>

On the whole, although separate delegations applauded the idea of concluding a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, they felt that the problem was so new and complex and required such thorough investigation that they insisted that the discussion of the proposed Soviet-American draft and the talks on this matter be continued at the next session of the Disarmament Commission. The 1979 report of the Disarmament Commission expressed the intention to continue the discussion of proposals regarding a convention prohibiting this kind of weapon at its next annual session.

The 34th Session of the UN General Assembly also considered the conclusion of an international convention to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The draft resolution submitted by the co-authors of the convention--the USSR and the United States--expressed the certainty that this kind of international agreement would help to spare mankind from the potential danger of the use of radioactive material for military purposes and would thereby serve to strengthen peace and prevent war. The draft requested the Disarmament Commission to continue coordinating the text of this convention and to submit a report on the results of this work to the General Assembly at its 35th session. The section of the draft resolution pertaining to enactment also included the suggestion that the agenda of the 35th Session of the General Assembly include a point entitled "The Prohibition of the Development, Production, Accumulation and Use of Radiological Weapons." The draft resolution was approved by the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly.

The next stage in the discussion of the ban on radiological weapons was the creation of a special task force within the Disarmament Commission in 1980.

A Soviet delegate addressed the task force to elucidate the joint Soviet-American proposal on the basic elements of the treaty prohibiting the development, production, accumulation and use of radiological weapons. This initiative was the subject of lively discussion. During the first meeting of the task force, however, representatives of some countries were already trying to denigrate the significance of the joint Soviet-American proposal and replace concrete talks with vague discussions of unrelated issues.

The various proposals made in regard to different aspects of the draft treaty can conditionally be divided into two main groups.



One group of proposals agrees with the interpretation of the objectives and goals of the future treaty by which the co-authors of the joint initiative were guided. These proposals envisaged either editorial clarification of the text of the joint Soviet-American document or the addition of certain statements which do not transcend the framework of the scope and target originally defined. They include the Belgian, Dutch, French, FRG, Australian and Canadian amendments. In connection with this, a Soviet delegate explained that many of the ideas expressed by these countries were already envisaged in the joint Soviet-U.S. document and that there was no need to add extra explanations to the balanced text. The task force heard additional arguments in support of this.

Another group of proposals envisages the kind of modification or supplementation of the text of the Soviet-American document that will essentially change its basic purpose and content. This applies, above all, to the Swedish, Yugoslavian, Egyptian, Pakistani and Venezuelan proposals regarding the extension of the treaty's sphere of application to types of activity that are unconnected with the prohibition of radiological weapons. They envisage, in particular, the extension of the ban to the destruction of nuclear facilities during the course of hostilities with the use of any weapon, to the radiological aspects of the use of nuclear weapons, and to weapons based on the use of beams of charged or neutral particles. Sweden, for example, wanted to connect the treaty on radiological weapons with other international agreements, including the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and mentioned the possibility that International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards could be applied to all radioactive materials and that the principles of the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials could be applied to the ban on the use of radioactive materials. Pakistan proposed that complaints about possible violations of the treaty not be submitted to the Security Council, as envisaged in the joint Soviet-American draft, but to some kind of specially created body or to the UN General Assembly, where there would be no veto power.

The Soviet delegation criticized the proposals in this second group as unconstructive and unrealistic suggestions. The U.S. delegation and delegates from some other countries expressed the same opinion of this group of proposals as a whole.

As a result of these differences of opinion, the task force on radiological weapons did not make the necessary progress at the summer session of the committee and was unable to begin coordinating the text of the draft treaty. The main reason for this is the existence of two different approaches to the scope and target of the ban, as described above. These approaches and their variations were recorded in the report of the Disarmament Commission task force. In addition, the document recorded the opinion that the joint Soviet-U.S. proposal is an acceptable basis for the coordination of the text of the future treaty, and contains the recommendation that the task force resume its work at the beginning of the 1981 session of the Disarmament Commission. The mandate of the task force to continue these talks will have to be confirmed.

The question of a ban on radiological weapons was brought up once again at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly in September-December 1980. Among the immediate measures specified in the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union, "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guaranteed International Security," to eliminate the danger of world war and to consolidate international security, such as the cessation of the arms race and the rejection of the use of force in international

relations, the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, the institution of stronger nuclear non-proliferation regulations and others, the need to prohibit other--non-nuclear--means of mass destruction, including radiological weapons, is specified.<sup>13</sup> The text of the memorandum defines the radiological weapon as "a weapon destroying the human organism by means of radioactive emissions resulting from the non-explosive decay of radioactive materials," and expresses the hope that the talks on the prohibition of this type of weapon will be concluded as quickly as possible. Addressing the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko stressed that "there are objective grounds for the quickest possible completion of the work on the treaty to prohibit another type of weapon of mass destruction--radiological."<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, the treaty prohibiting radiological weapons could play an important part in curbing the arms race and delivering mankind from the danger of the development and use of one of the possible new types of weapons of mass destruction. This would represent a sizable step toward the prevention of the use of technological progress in the development of new types of weapons. Many obstacles still lie ahead, however, along the path to the implementation of the Soviet proposal to ban the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the signing of a radiological weapon ban treaty.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 26.
2. L. I. Brez'nev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], Moscow, 1976, vol 5, p 320.
3. PRAVDA, 25 September 1975.
4. Disarmament Commission Document SSD/514.
5. Disarmament Commission Document SSD/291.
6. Disarmament Commission Document SD/31.
7. SD/31, p 2.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p 3.
11. SD/PV. 40.
12. SD/PV. 41.
13. PRAVDA, 26 September 1980.
14. Ibid., 24 September 1980.

THE U.S. INVESTMENT PATTERN TODAY

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[Article by R. A. Mishukova]

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## THE AMERICAN PATH OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

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[Article by M. A. Men'shikova]

[Text] This article was written by recently deceased Marina Amazaspovna Men'shikova, candidate of economic sciences and renowned scholar in the field of international and American economics. She was the author of several monographs and articles which made a perceptible contribution to Soviet economic science. She was working on a new book when she died. This article is an abridgement of a chapter from this unfinished work.

The analysis of the developmental paths of American agriculture is a definite part of Marxist doctrine on the economic development of capitalism. We will briefly describe how the Marxist approach to the matter evolved, reflecting the changing structure of U.S. agriculture and its effect on the development of the economy as a whole.

Let us first recall that the first volume of K. Marx' "Das Kapital" has what could be called a "double" conclusion. In the 24th chapter of this volume, Marx demonstrates how the laws of capitalist accumulation give rise to anticapitalist tendencies and forces within the depths of this social system and eventually lead to the expropriation of the expropriators.<sup>1</sup> In the very next chapter, the 25th, Marx sets forth the theory of colonization. This process is examined here as one of the inevitable results of the workings of those same laws of accumulation that govern the development of the entire capitalist economy. The concentration of tremendous wealth and capital at one end of the scale and of unemployment and poverty at the other led to the export of capital and to the emigration of manpower from Europe--the cradle of capitalism. Colonization served as a partial solution to some economic and social contradictions in a number of countries, but it also led to their reproduction in other countries, thereby giving them broader, and even global, scales.

Within the context of our chosen subject, we should note that in this case the mass emigration of skilled labor from Europe to America and to other "white" colonies is of immediate significance. The establishment of European capital and workers on the vast, fertile, unexploited and actually "free" virgin lands of the New World remained one of the chief forms of colonization. It was this international process that gave birth to a particular, unique phenomenon--American agriculture.



From the very beginning, agriculture in the United States, in contrast to agriculture in the Old World, was based on virtually unlimited resources of land. For a new settler, this land was easily accessible and almost free. For decades, it was a firmly established government policy to give land to all who wanted it at an extremely low, symbolic price. As a rule, these lands were not occupied by large owners, who would have used the land for the enslavement of petty landless peasants, but were distributed to independent farmers who worked their own land. Such attributes of the system of private ownership as the cost of land and rent were virtually nonexistent in these regions at that time.

This unique set of circumstances, according to Marx, led to the comparatively unimpeded transfer of manpower from industry to agriculture. Whereas laborers in the Old World were driven off the land and were put through the mill of urban civilization, for many decades the New World afforded part of the industrial proletariat an opportunity to move in the opposite direction--into rural regions--and transformed these proletarians into independent farmers.

The unique historical conditions of U.S. economic development helped to establish relatively high wages in industry, which were already approximately double the wages of industrial workers in the leading Western European countries, in real terms, by the middle of the 19th century. This factor had an extremely strong, multifaceted and prolonged impact. The higher wages brought in a constant flow of skilled immigrant labor, establishing one of the most important sources of America's rapid economic growth. The relatively high cost of labor stimulated technical progress and gave industrialists more incentive to acquire labor-saving equipment, and this promoted the rapid augmentation of labor productivity. The high wages accelerated the creation of a broad market for consumer goods, and the production of these goods soon took on huge dimensions and became an important factor in the reproductive process.

In other words, the consequences of the abundance of cheap land in the nation's West far transcended the boundaries of agriculture.

At the same time, a large part of U.S. agriculture developed under fundamentally different conditions. Whereas the family farm became the basis of agriculture in the West and Midwest, agricultural production in the South rested on large cotton plantations, where super-cheap slave labor was mercilessly exploited. Slavery became the chief means of initial accumulation for plantation owners. Besides this, capitalism and slavery enjoyed their honeymoon in a broader context as well. The industrial revolution laid the foundations for a cotton industry, and its rapid growth would have been impossible without cheap cotton. American cotton plantations became an integral part of world capitalist development throughout much of the 19th century.

This dual basis of American farming, however, was already doomed at the time of its peak development. When the slave plantations began to move west, they became the direct rivals of the family farms in the struggle for free land. These two different structures met head-on in a fight to the death, and the plantations had to retreat. In time, slavery was abolished, but the cheap labor of yesterday's slaves remained the economic basis of the plantations for decades. When machine technology finally took over the plantations, the mass migration of black laborers to the north began, and this started a new era in the history of capitalist urban civilization in the United States.

In the second half of the 19th century, American cotton and wheat became important factors in world agriculture. Cotton from the United States posed stiff competition for the cotton from the Western European countries' colonies in Africa, and American wheat began to threaten grain farming in Western Europe itself.

From the 1870's through the 1890's these processes engendered the first lengthy crisis of overproduction in capitalist agriculture. The effects of the crisis were most severe for Western European grain farming, which could no longer compete with the cheap grain from the virgin prairies of the New World.

The relatively low cost of American grain in comparison to grain from Western Europe was not only a result of unique natural conditions. The cost of producing wheat in the prairie zones did not include rent, whereas grain cultivation costs in Western Europe were compounded by high rental payments due to the specific socioeconomic conditions prevailing in this region.

The grain exported by Russia was also distinguished by high competitive potential, but the reason was different: the cheap labor of the Russian peasants, who had just recently been set free.

The cheap grain imported from the United States and Russia led to the radical reconstruction of Western European agriculture at the end of the 19th century. The countries of this region became highly specialized producers, and some of them dealt exclusively in the export of animal husbandry products. Their grain farming was reoriented for the cultivation of fodder grain with an emphasis on intensive capitalist investments in land to heighten productivity. Within a relatively short period of time, the yield of grain here was two or three times as great as the yield on the American prairies. Nevertheless, these countries continued to import all of their wheat.

When this reconstruction had been completed, Western European agriculture was once again able to compete, even in spite of the higher rent, and preserved its socioeconomic structure, which differed significantly from the American one.

This was the time when V. I. Lenin's fundamental works on Russian and foreign agriculture and its role in the economic development of capitalism were published. At that time, Russia was a primarily agrarian country. The system of Russian agricultural statistics, organized by zemstvos, was well-developed and represented a solid basis for the detailed scientific analysis of socioeconomic conditions in farming. American agriculture also attracted V. I. Lenin's attention for similar reasons. His book, "Novyye dannyye o zakonakh razvitiya kapitalizma v zemledelii. Vypusk I. Kapitalizm i zemledeliye v Soyedinyennykh Shtatakh Ameriki" [New Information about the Laws of Capitalist Development in Farming. Book I. Capitalism and Farming in the United States of America], written in 1915, was based on an analysis of the data of periodic censuses in American agriculture.

In his works, Lenin developed two areas of analysis that are directly related to our topic: the types and paths of agricultural development; tendencies in the development of the family farm.

Among the many problems confronting Russia at that time, there was a serious need to choose a path of agricultural development. The abolition of serfdom made several different types of capitalist development possible. The prevailing opinion at

that time was that the nation was not ready for capitalism due to the traditional communal organization of the Russian peasantry, and a different, non-capitalist path would therefore have to be taken.

Lenin demonstrated the impossibility of the prolonged coexistence of two different socioeconomic structures--the capitalist structure in the cities and industrial centers and the non-capitalist structure in agriculture. In view of the fact that capitalism was dominant in industry, the communal organization of farming would have to make way for it. Lenin discussed two possible paths of capitalist development in agriculture. One of these, the Prussian path, consisted in the conversion of large estates into plantations of the capitalist type. In this case, the peasantry would gradually disappear and become part of the proletariat. The other alternative, which Lenin called the American path, consisted in the liquidation of large semifeudal estates by means of land reform and of the conversion of peasant farmsteads into family farms, essentially operating on their own land. Lenin did not exclude the possibility that other capitalist forms of agricultural organization might be chosen. In fact, the classic form that was analyzed in detail by Marx in volume III of "Das Kapital" was the prevailing type of capitalist farm in England, employing hired labor and working rented land. However, Lenin discussed the American and Prussian paths because he believed that these were the most realistic alternatives for Russia.

Lenin preferred the American path. He believed that the Prussian path would be long, agonizing and unfair to tens of millions of landless peasants in Russia. The Prussian path would strengthen the economic base of the most conservative class in Russian society, the class which absolutely abhorred any kind of radical reform. In his opinion, the American path, which would signify broad agrarian reform in Russia, would be more effective in the economic sense because it would promote the rapid development of agricultural production.

The policy that was actually conducted by Russia until 1917, however, was a combination of a primarily Prussian path with a pitiful attempt to cultivate a dual structure consisting of large plantations and strong farmers (kulaks) of the capitalist type (the so-called Stolypin Reform). As a result of this policy, the Russian peasants supported the idea of the socialization and nationalization of land at the time of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

According to Lenin, the fact that the American path was preferable did not mean that the family farm was a permanent form of agricultural organization. Lenin examined this aspect in several works, including "Novyye dannyye o zakonakh razvitiya kapitalizma v zemledelii." He demonstrated in these works that the traditional basis of American agriculture--the family farm with its accent on family labor and ownership of the land being cultivated--was rapidly being eroded by market forces and was making way for large capitalist farms based on hired labor (or a combination of family and hired labor). Besides this, there was mass migration by the less successful farmers, who joined the ranks of the urban proletariat. The total number of farms in the nation rose quickly in the second half of the 19th century: from 1.4 million in 1850 to 5.7 million in 1900. Some growth was still noticeable at beginning of this century, but it virtually stopped between 1910 and 1930 (6.4 million in 1910 and 6.5 million in 1930).<sup>2</sup>



The problems of family farms were subsequently compounded by the new crisis of overproduction in agriculture, which lasted from the early 1920's to the mid-1940's. It was almost impossible for farmers to migrate to the cities during the "Great Depression" (1929-1933), but this migration resumed on an even greater scale when the crisis had passed. In comparison to the maximum figure (6.8 million) in 1935, the total number of farms decreased sharply--to 4.7 million in 1955 and 2.8 million in 1975. The average size of the American farm, which remained almost unchanged between 1880 and 1910 (134 and 138 acres), later increased to 155 acres in 1935, 258 acres in 1955 and 391 acres in 1975. In 1910, 19 percent of all agricultural land was on large farms of 1,000 acres or more. By 1935 the proportion had risen to 29 percent, by 1955 it was 46 percent, and by 1975 it was 58 percent. Now there are only 150,000 such farms left--that is, only 6 percent of the total.<sup>3</sup>

In an analysis of information about the 1910's, V. I. Lenin noted that American agriculture was then in the pre-machine, manufacturing stage of its development. Since that time, particularly after the mid-1940's, farms have undergone rapid industrialization. Grain farming, animal husbandry and, finally, cotton cultivation were mechanized, and systems of machinery began to be used. The electrification of rural areas contributed to this. The use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides grew by leaps and bounds. Irrigation systems were widespread.

As a result of this technical revolution, the American farms became more capital-intensive, labor productivity rose sevenfold between 1929 and the mid-1970's, and the productivity of land (measured in terms of the gross product per acre of cultivated land) doubled.

During the course of this revolution, the socioeconomic structure of American agriculture underwent radical changes. Some farms were integrated in complexes of industrial, agricultural, trade, transport and financial enterprises, which were given the name agribusiness. The dominant and leading role in this integration was taken on by industrial and trade corporations, as well as banks, but not by the farms. The vertically integrated farmer was now an independent entrepreneur only by virtue of the legal status of his farm. American agriculture became part of the general economic mechanism of state-monopoly capitalism. In this way, the old agricultural system, based primarily on the independent family farm, actually ceased to exist.

The American path did not take root in agriculture in the majority of capitalist countries. In Western Europe this could not take place due to a complex combination of large land ownership and a traditional peasantry. Modern capitalist farms are not the prevailing type here. The development of the agribusiness made this structure even more complex. Land reforms were carried out too late in Western Europe and did not bring it closer to the American model of agricultural development. In Japan the land reform after World War II essentially eradicated feudal relations in rural areas. As a result of the specific correlation between the abundance of labor and the shortage of agricultural land, however, small farms prevail here, and they are more likely to utilize intensive irrigation and intensive labor than machines.

The Soviet Union and most of the Eastern European countries chose a completely different, socialist path. The present socioeconomic structure of agriculture in these countries is based, with few exceptions, on state farms and production

cooperatives. This structure was the logical development of previous structures. Agrarian reforms here were radical and comprehensive. They liquidated large estates and turned much of the land over to the peasants. In some of these countries the land was nationalized, and in others the right of private ownership of the land is considerably restricted. Despite the extensive redistribution of land, most of the individual farms were extremely small and their productivity was extremely low. This soon became a serious obstacle in the way of accelerated industrialization. The prevalence of small private ownership in agriculture was inconsistent with large state industries. This duality was incompatible with rapid economic growth and, what is more, with the preservation of the economic and political independence of states. In the USSR and a number of other countries, this conflict has been resolved by means of collectivization--that is, the unification of small private farms in production cooperatives--and by means of the establishment of state farms in the particular locations where the cooperative form was inapplicable (for example, on some old estates, on virgin lands, and so forth).

This meant that these countries had to make a new choice--not between the American and Prussian paths, as before, but between the slow capitalist transformation of small private farms and the socialist type of agricultural organization. The choice fell to socialism.

How does agriculture in the developing countries look now, in light of this analysis? Which path will they choose?

In these countries, the basic agricultural problem will consist in determining how to establish conditions for the rapid growth of production and the provision of the growing population with food. Even if the present, extremely low food consumption standards are maintained, agricultural production will have to be at least doubled before the end of the century. This presupposes an average annual growth rate of 2.5 percent--that is, the "average" figure in the population growth forecast of the United Nations. A significant rise in nutritional levels, on the other hand, would require that agricultural production in these countries be at least quadrupled.

According to a recent UN study,<sup>4</sup> this kind of growth is technically possible if around 230 million hectares of farmland is put to active use and if sufficient additional capital is invested in reclamation, irrigation, the production and distribution of fertilizer, scientific research and development, and conservation. According to experts, this would at least double, and possibly triple, the productivity of land.

The UN study stresses that the successful outcome of this work will depend on the proper socioeconomic measures.

Which path of agricultural development will these countries choose--the American (with subsequent changes), the Prussian or the socialist? We must assume that each country will make its own choice, guided by its own specific conditions and traditional values. It would be impossible to simply transfer a developmental model from one country to another. Even the transfer of techniques is not a simple matter. For example, to considerably increase the yield of wheat in Mexico, India and Pakistan, Norman Borlaug, the "father of the green revolution," spent years cultivating strains which would produce the best results in the specific natural conditions of these countries. There are certain fields--such as, for example,

rice paddy farming--where American technology is simply useless, and if foreign technology should be required, it would more likely be Japanese or some other, but it must be adapted to the specific conditions of the region in question.

As for the more difficult problem of choosing socioeconomic structures, we can say with some justification that the American path is not suitable for the developing world. Why not?

In the first place, in the agriculture of the developing countries there is generally a huge labor surplus, and this means that labor-intensive technology is more suitable than labor-saving devices. Experience indicates that labor-intensive technology is usually suitable for small peasant farms, production cooperatives and large plantations. It would be difficult to imagine how the American type of family farm could become the prevailing form under these circumstances. In the second place, technical progress in agriculture will only be possible in the majority of developing countries after extensive irrigation work. It is virtually unthinkable that irrigation might be organized in other than a centralized manner--that is, in the form of state or collective enterprises--under the conditions of a gigantic preponderance of small farms. In the third place, the difficult task of putting large new areas of farmland to active use will require intensive general preparations, technical supplies, large-scale irrigation projects, the resettlement of manpower, and the construction of roads, hothouses and workers' quarters. None of this can be accomplished without special programs envisaging huge state investments and it is possible that it cannot be accomplished without state production units.

Therefore, the path of agricultural development in the developing countries will apparently be primarily non-American and even non-capitalist.

We have no wish to denigrate or underestimate the international role of American agriculture. It is completely obvious that it has had a considerable effect on the development of the world economy and world agriculture. In several cases, it has established experience which has been either emulated or utilized in the resolution of specific problems in other countries. The agricultural experience in the United States, however, is purely national, and even unique, in many respects due to its peculiar combination of vast and easily accessible virgin lands with scarce but highly productive labor resources. This unique combination has rarely been repeated anywhere in the past, and it is highly unlikely that it will be repeated in the future.

The suitability of a path of agricultural development for a region or country must be determined with a view to socioeconomic conditions, the specific correlation between land, labor, capital and technology, and the prevailing type of development and organization in industry and other sectors of the economy. American agriculture is no exception to this rule.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. We could also mention the particular attention given to initial accumulation in the 24th chapter, which applies directly to the explanation of the reasons for the rise of "king cotton"--that is, the cotton plantations in the United States.

2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 137;  
"Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979," p 683.
3. Ibid.
4. See "The Future of the World Economy. Report of a Group of UN Experts Headed  
by W. Leontief," Moscow, 1979.

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**THE POLITICAL CINEMA: THE 1970's IN REVIEW**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 38-50**

**[Article by V. P. Shestakov and T. G. Il'in]**

**[Not translated by JPPS]**

**CSO: 1803**

## WASHINGTON AND THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 51-56

[Article by A. K. Kislov]

[Text] Last fall the situation in the Middle East, which has been one of the "hottest spots" on our planet for more than a decade, acquired even more dangerous features. The actions of the Camp David deal's authors exacerbated the already acute conflicts between the Arab countries and peoples and Israel, which has stubbornly refused to comply with the UN decision on the liquidation of the results of Israeli aggression, and they set up additional obstacles to the fair settlement of the Palestinian problem which lies at the basis of the main conflict. What is more, the danger to world peace posed by the unresolved conflicts in the Middle East was compounded by an armed conflict between Iraq and Iran.

Naturally, this conflict did not spring from a vacuum. It had a rich nutritional medium in the form of historically determined territorial, religious and, finally, ideological conflicts, which have existed between these countries for a long time and have been aggravated by the legacy of the colonial past. But this medium existed long ago, while the broad-scale military conflict between Iran and Iraq did not break out until September 1980. It is hardly likely that this was a tragic misunderstanding. Apparently, some kind of special, specific causes also existed.

When we think about these causes and the possible consequences of the Iran-Iraq conflict, which has taken on large dimensions and a prolonged character, we first try to determine who might benefit from the deaths of hundreds and thousands of civilians in both countries as a result of bombs and artillery shelling; who would benefit from the disruption of economic processes in both countries and the destruction of industrial enterprises, oil production complexes and other facilities with a total value of many billions of dollars.

One thing is absolutely clear: Neither the people of these two countries nor their true friends need any of this. This is why the Soviet Union has consistently hoped, from the very beginning of the conflict, that, as L. I. Brezhnev put it, "Iran and Iraq will settle their differences around the negotiation table." In addition, in accordance with its principled policy line, the USSR is categorically against any kind of foreign intervention in the Iran-Iraq conflict. "We," L. I. Brezhnev stressed, "are not planning to interfere in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. We hope for the quickest possible political settlement of the conflict

through the efforts of the two sides.... The Persian Gulf zone, just as any other part of the world, is the sphere of the vital interests of the states located in this zone, and not any other state. No one has the right to creep into their affairs or act as their patrons or as self-appointed 'guardians of the law.'"

As for the United States, as soon as the armed conflict broke out between Iraq and Iran on a broad scale, statements about "neutrality" and "nonintervention" were voiced more than once in Washington, and on the very highest level. As renowned commentator J. Kraft reported on 28 September 1980 in the WASHINGTON POST, however, "the hostilities between Iraq and Iran have clearly defined the U.S. purpose. It does not consist in taking a neutral position between the fighting sides. On the contrary, U.S. interests would be served best by the overthrow of the present Iranian government and the establishment of a pro-Western regime in Tehran." This course of events, in his opinion, "would strengthen the shaky regimes in Turkey and Pakistan" and "it would be easier for Egypt to take further steps toward peace with Israel" (that is, toward a separate deal based on the Camp David conspiracy).

What is Washington's actual position? A valid answer to this question will require a more careful examination of U.S. relations with both sides in the conflict.

On 7 June 1967, Iraq protested the position taken by Washington during the course of Israeli aggression by breaking off diplomatic relations with the United States. They have not been reestablished to date. During these years, Iraq became one of the chief exporters of oil to the Western countries, especially France, Italy, Spain and Brazil, as well as a permanent sales market for the goods of these countries. As for the United States, imports of Iraqi oil represent less than 1 percent of total U.S. oil imports. Nonetheless, trade and economic relations between these two countries took on an extremely intensive character in the second half of the 1970's. For example, whereas in 1972 the United States exported only 26 million dollars' worth of goods to Iraq, by 1975 the figure had already risen to 300 million dollars, and in the first 6 months of 1980 it rose (calculated in annual terms) to approximately 700 million dollars. The expansion of trade was accompanied by the growth (in the absence of official diplomatic relations) of the permanent diplomatic missions of the two countries in Washington and Bagdad by means of the addition of special interest offices, staffed by American diplomats in Bagdad and Iraqi diplomats in Washington and operating through the embassies of other states.

After the Carter Administration moved into the White House, Washington made a fairly vigorous attempt to reinforce the development of economic relations with the reestablishment of diplomatic relations on the embassy level. P. Habib, who was then the under secretary of state for political affairs, was sent to Bagdad to negotiate the matter. But this did not end in the official resumption of diplomatic relations. Some difficulties also became apparent in U.S.-Iraqi trade relations. For example, on the pretext that Iraq was "protecting international terrorism," the U.S. Department of Commerce did not issue licenses for the export of five Boeing passenger planes to Iraq for operation by an Iraqi airline (11 of this firm's civilian aircraft had previously been exported to Iraq).

According to admissions in the U.S. press, fluctuations of this kind within the framework of Washington's general line of developing relations with Iraq were not

caused by factors connected with the struggle against "international terrorism," but essentially by Iraq's active anti-Israeli position. But Washington's flirtation with Bagdad continued. In spring 1980 the U.S. President's National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski made the following comment when he appeared on television on the PBS network: "We do not find any fundamental inconsistencies in U.S. and Iraqi interests.... And we do not feel that American-Iraqi relations should remain antagonistic forever." Commenting on Brzezinski's remark, the American newspaper NEWSDAY noted on 9 June 1980 that "the Carter Administration has good reason to hope for better relations with Iraq. In view of the fact that the administration's policy on the Iranian question has reached an impasse and the end of the hostage crisis is not in sight, U.S. officials regard Iraq as a potential obstacle to the Iranian Islamic revolution.... The American administration now views Hussein (Iraqi President Saddam Hussein--A. K.) and Iraq in general as defenders of Saudi Arabia and its oil."

Many articles have recently appeared in the Western press which imply that the pre-history of the armed conflict was closely connected with the "careful overtures" made to Iraq by National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski (this is what the WASHINGTON POST reported on 30 September 1980, for example), that this pre-history represents "exceptionally skillful instigation for the purpose of involving Saddam Hussein and Iraq in a war against Iran" (France's FIGARO, 30 October 1980), and so forth. What is more, FIGARO even stated that as early as June 1980, when Brzezinski visited Jordan, he met in secret with Saddam Hussein on the Jordanian-Iraqi border and assured him of Jordan's full support (this was later corroborated by Jordanian King Hussein's announcement that he was on Iraq's side in this conflict). Furthermore, according to FIGARO, during the same meeting, Brzezinski informed the president of Iraq that "the United States will not object to Iraqi claims to Shatt-el-Arab (a border river over which Iraq claims complete sovereignty--A. K.) or to the possible creation of a Republic of Arabistan (on the territory of Iran's Khuzistan province)."

Setting forth the position of the Western countries as a whole in regard to the Iran-Iraq conflict, England's DAILY TELEGRAPH stressed on 23 September 1980 that a stronger Iraq would probably be to the West's benefit.

Although Z. Brzezinski later denied that his moves in the Middle East were aimed at fomenting an armed conflict between Iraq and Iran, there is no question that this conflict has afforded the United States new opportunities to exert pressure in convenient directions, both on Iraq and, in particular, on Iran.

The status of American-Iranian relations after the overthrow of the pro-American shah's regime in this country has already been discussed in enough detail in our magazine.<sup>1</sup> But it would be worthwhile to reemphasize the point that the American administration was obsessed with the idea of impeding the development of the Iranian revolution and returning this country to the track of pro-American policy. It is indicative that this idea was also shared by a number of prominent Republican spokesmen. For example, former Secretary of State H. Kissinger, who is now one of the men closest to President-Elect Reagan, reiterated his previous statement that the "fall of the pro-American regime in Iran is one of the main political

1. See, for example, SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1980, pp 15-26.



catastrophes of the postwar period" (naturally, catastrophic for American imperialism--A. K.) and announced on "Meet the Press," a television program, that he believed that the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran "will lead to the reassessment of the present Iranian Government's position."

It was precisely for this reason that Washington strategists invested great hopes in the military conflict between Iran and Iraq. The American mass media played an overtly provocative role in the escalation of this conflict. They printed exaggerated reports of mutual accusations leveled by the leaders of Iran and Iraq, vigorously spread the rumor that the revolution had brought the Iranian economy and army to the verge of total collapse, and implied that the arrival of Iraqi troops at Iran's borders would touch off a rebellion by the entire Arab population of Khuzistan, Iran's main oil-producing province, and that this would be followed by the disintegration of the Iranian Government and its army. All of this was flavored with warnings, which were lavishly offered by, in particular, U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, that the "chief danger" and the "real threat" to Iran and to Iraq was "another country"--"in the North."

As soon as the military conflict broke out between Iraq and Iran, U.S. militaristic circles immediately used it as a pretext for further energetic efforts to build up the American military presence in the Near and Middle East--a buildup which began long before the conflict. Disguising its actual intentions with references to its concern about the hostilities and the threat they allegedly posed to the shipment of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, the United States engaged in intensive preparations for open intervention in the affairs of the countries of this zone, located in direct proximity to the borders of the USSR. "The Iraqi-Iranian war," the NEW YORK TIMES noted on 12 October 1980, "has greatly profited Americans in this region. The United States has been able to turn its secret alliance with Saudi Arabia into a reality. The Saudis have not only agreed to accept electronic surveillance planes, but also the military presence of Americans, which they had long refused to accept. What is more, they requested this themselves. Their example could be followed by other countries in the Persian Gulf zone."

In connection with the Iran-Iraq conflict, there was speculation in the American press about what would happen if Iran or Iraq should somehow block the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the oil imported by the Western countries is shipped, or if the oilfields of Saudi Arabia or another oil-producing country in this region should be bombed. There were no serious grounds for this kind of speculation because both Iran and Iraq had repeatedly declared that they would not impede the export of oil by other Persian Gulf countries. Nonetheless, on the pretext of "guaranteeing the uninterrupted provision of the West with oil from the Persian Gulf zone," Washington not only built up its armed forces in the Middle East to unprecedented dimensions, but also tried to establish a solid basis for the creation of a new military bloc in the Persian Gulf zone. Washington used the Iran-Iraq conflict to further its long-cherished plans to organize a military bloc in this part of the world under the U.S. aegis and to involve allies in its own adventures--within the framework of an "international" armed force. According to a report in the 18 October 1980 issue of the WASHINGTON POST, "officials in France, England and other allied countries admit that they began to negotiate the coordination of their efforts almost immediately after the Iran-Iraq conflict flared up at the end of September. According to informed sources, the negotiating partners are the United States, France, England, Australia, New Zealand and some Persian

Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates." The plan even called for the sanctioning of the creation of this "international" force by the UN Security Council.

Renowned American commentator S. Rosenfeld summarized Washington's behavior in connection with the Iran-Iraq conflict in a WASHINGTON POST article on 10 October 1980: "There is no question that all of this is intervention, regardless of whether you feel that this is a wise, necessary and timely show of American strength or whether you are still wondering, as I am, where all of this is leading us."

It is certainly true that the road to real security in the Persian Gulf zone and in other important shipping regions does not lie through the even greater concentration of armed forces and arms in these regions. It is clear that an increase in the number of war planes and helicopters of third countries in the air, or of military ships of third countries in the waters, of the zone of hostilities will increase the chance that the conflict will be escalated, even through error, not to mention deliberate actions by some side.

In May 1980 a conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee advocated unimpeded shipping and proposed that military activity be reduced and limited in regions of important sea lanes, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. This proposal is not only still valid, but is even more to the point now. Judging by the response of the United States and some other Western countries to this proposal, however, they are interested less in the security of oil shipments from the Persian Gulf than in the expansion and reinforcement of the positions of imperialist powers, especially the United States, in this part of the world.

Evidence of this can be found in the loud statements being voiced in Washington, appealing for preparations for large-scale, long-term and costly military presence in the Persian Gulf, which will not cease even after Iraq and Iran have declared a truce. Furthermore, many in Washington feel that the "positive aspects" of the conflict include not only the debilitation of Iran and Iraq as a result of hostilities and destruction, but also the disunification of the Arab and Moslem states. Some already apparent consequences of this conflict are arousing satisfaction in the United States and in the West in general--the cessation of activity by OPEC, which was preparing to celebrate its 20th anniversary in Baghdad in November 1980, the decision of several members of OPEC (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar) to increase their daily petroleum output to 1 million barrels to compensate at least partially for the complete cessation of Iraqi and Iranian oil exports; Iraq's severance of diplomatic relations with Syria and Libya and Saudi Arabia's severance of relations with Libya, which dealt another blow to the unity of the Arab countries--the unity that is such an essential feature of the struggle to eradicate the after-effects of Israeli aggression. With two of its closest friends and allies in this part of the world at war with one another, the PLO has been put in a particularly difficult position by the Iran-Iraq conflict.

But expansionist circles in Israel are the happiest of all: Two countries which possess substantial resources and which have taken a resolute anti-Israeli stand until recently, are draining and debilitating one another. It is for this reason that Israeli ruling circles are doing everything within their power to keep the flames of this military conflagration burning, forgetting that they are fanning

these flames close to the powderkeg on their own threshold. In connection with this, it is interesting that the Western press has reported that Israeli aircraft, camouflaged as Iranian planes, took part in bombing Iraq's nuclear power center. These reports were accompanied by references to an "ultra-secret Pentagon document," according to which an Iraqi nuclear arsenal would represent a "potential threat to Israel, which is already stockpiling nuclear warheads." Finally, according to J. Schlesinger, former U.S. secretary of defense and secretary of energy, the Iran-Iraq conflict should relieve the pressure that some Western European countries have been exerting on Israel since the middle of 1980 to compel it to agree to a political settlement of the Middle East conflict. The Iran-Iraq conflict "undermined," he wrote, "the widespread belief in the European community that Israel was the only obstacle standing in the way of a guaranteed constant supply of oil. This was should undermine the belief that a preventive sacrifice of Israeli interests (the wording is obviously pro-Israeli here--A. K.) would guarantee energy 'peace in our time.'"

Even in Washington, however, not everyone is prepared to share in the happiness of the Israeli extremists. "The crisis which broke out in the Persian Gulf and over it," warned Professor J. Horowitz, renowned American expert on the Middle East, in an article in the WASHINGTON STAR on 30 September 1980, "transcends regional boundaries. This is a global crisis. There are some who believe that it will create the threat of a third world war."

According to the majority of sober-minded analysts, including Americans, the best hope of avoiding this would consist in careful consideration on Washington's part: While it is conducting its interventionist, incendiary policy in a region located near the borders of the Soviet Union, it should weigh all the consequences before it decides to openly intervene in the conflict. The very existence of the Soviet Union's peaceful but firm and principled foreign policy is now definitely limiting the opportunities for the kind of "gunboat policy" Washington has recently been trying to revive.

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## THE CONGRESS AFTER THE ELECTIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 56-60

[Article by Ye. M. Silayeva]

[Text] The past year was marked by a massive defeat for the Democratic Party. For the first time in a quarter of a century, the Republican Party won a majority in the Senate, where there are now 53 Republicans and 47 Democrats (in the 96th Congress the ratio of Democrats to Republicans was 58:41); the Democrats' last stronghold is the House of Representatives, where this party held on to the majority (243:192), but even here it now has 33 seats less than it did before the elections. After the loss of four gubernatorial offices by Democrats, the Republicans now have 23 and the Democrats have 27; prior to the elections the ratio was 31:19 in favor of the Democrats.

These are the statistics of the changes on Capitol Hill. They symbolize a significant regrouping of forces in the political arena. For the first time since the 1950's there is a bloc consisting of Senate conservatives and the White House, where the Oval Office will now be occupied by Republican R. Reagan.

Liberal legislators were the main targets and victims of the congressional elections. A campaign against liberal Democrats was launched by rightist groups, among which the National Conservative Political Action Committee played a leading role. It designated as targets five senators who were too liberal for its taste--J. Culver, F. Church, G. McGovern, A. Cranston and B. Bayh--and declared its intention to drive them out of the Congress. This was the beginning of a rightist offensive intended to make the Congress Republican and conservative.

The first test of strength was the 1978 congressional elections. At that time, the rightists concentrated on the seats of liberal Senators R. Clark and T. McIntyre, unseated them and filled their seats with such ultra-conservative Republicans as R. Jepsen (Iowa) and G. Humphrey (New Hampshire). Anyone who kept an eye on the 1978 elections will remember the tactic used by the rightists: They surrounded the "victim" with a ring of opponents and launched a massed offensive through the combined efforts of the National Conservative Political Action Committee, rightist religious organizations, groups opposing the expansion of civil rights and local Republican Party officials.

In 1980 the rightists used this tactic again, but on an even broader scale. All the campaigns launched against the liberals resembled one another. All of them



were preceded by painstaking preparations and were generously financed by corporations and rightist groups. Well-trained politicians with legislative experience, most of them members of the House of Representatives who had proved to be 100-percent conservatives, were set up as the rivals of liberal Democrats. The campaign themes did not differ much either: Senators were accused of being spineless and of wasting taxpayers' money, the result of which was high taxes and inflation. The foreign policy statements of the conservatives did not differ either: Above all, they accused the liberals of "appeasing the enemy" and of "acting weak"--that is, of not giving enough support to military spending and of approving the treaty on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT II) and the Panama Canal Treaty.

Here, for example, are the accusations leveled against F. Church by the senator's Republican rival, S. Symms: He had weakened the CIA, voted against the B-1 bomber, against the neutron bomb and against a strong navy; he helped to escalate inflation and increase taxes; as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he was responsible for the loss of the Panama Canal, for the "disturbances" in Iran and Afghanistan and for the SALT II treaty.

Symms, an ultra-conservative former member of the House of Representatives, calls himself a libertarian, a supporter of a free market and an opponent of government interference in the economy. His campaign was widely financed: He was one of the ten legislators who received the largest contributions from the political action committees of corporations, some of them oil companies, including Exxon, the largest monopoly in the world. The National Conservative Political Action Committee set up a branch in Idaho and called it "Anyone but Church." Symms received considerable support from the ultra-rightist Freeman Institute, an organization founded in 1971 by W. Skousen, who was also one of the founders of the John Birch Society. The lengthy campaign against Church, using television and the press, produced results. In November, S. Symms, a mediocre congressman who was only famous for his habit of voting against just about everything, defeated an outstanding politician, Chairman F. Church of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The attack on another liberal, J. Culver, followed a similar script. His opponent was conservative C. Grassley, who was a member of the ultra-conservative group in the House of Representatives. The campaign against Culver was based on the same accusations of extravagance, "weakness" and "appeasement" of the foreign enemy. Grassley himself believes in power politics, advocates the continued buildup of U.S. military strength and opposes SALT II. His campaign was generously financed; furthermore, he has a large fortune of his own--of around 9 million dollars. Rightist religious organizations gave this campaign the nature of a crusade for a return to the moral values of Christianity, against abortion, against equal rights for women, and so forth. They organized several noisy demonstrations and rallies in support of Grassley.

Rightist forces in American politics have repeatedly declared that the 1978 and 1980 campaigns were only the first steps toward the conquest of a Republican majority in the Congress. In 1982 the struggle to attain this goal will be continued.

The political action committees set up by corporations have played an important role in this struggle. Their number has increased quickly since 1974, when a law was passed to authorize corporations to create such committees for direct intervention in politics. By the time of the 1980 congressional elections, more than 1,000 political action committees had collected 23.1 million dollars and distributed these funds--mainly to Republicans. In this respect, they were far ahead of labor unions, which serve the Democrats as a major source of funds.

The Republican Party National Committee collected huge amounts for the 1980 congressional elections--12 times as much as the Democrats. By the end of August the Republican Committee on Elections to the House of Representatives had collected 16.4 million dollars, while the Democrats had only collected 1.3 million. The Republican Committee on Senate Elections had around 9 million dollars, but the Democratic committee had only 841,342 dollars.

The two sides in the confrontation between the liberals and conservatives were obviously unequal. The liberals were opposed by a strong united coalition: the Republican Party itself, which made a tremendous effort to prepare candidates and to organize and finance their campaigns; groups of the "new right," which were conducting an ostensibly independent campaign--as a third contender in the inter-party duel--on the side of the Republicans; finally, organizations of rightist evangelists, who crusaded for the "protection" of morality.

The liberal Democrats received virtually no support from their own party. The position of the liberals was seriously complicated by the fact that J. Carter was the party leader in the 1980 campaign; the unpopularity of his administration severely injured Democratic senators' chances and was one of the reasons for their defeat. The legislators sensed this problem long before their defeat in November and tried to get rid of Carter. Congress became the center of the opposition to his nomination at the national party convention. The leader of the Democratic majority, R. Byrd, who was justifiably worried about becoming the minority leader, supported the idea of an "open convention." The group of liberals in the Democratic faction of the House of Representatives were also in favor of an "open convention" and against Carter.

This did not mean that all of the members of the movement for the open convention automatically supported E. Kennedy, whose platform did not promise the party success in the election at a time of mounting conservative feeling. It was not enough to simply get rid of the unpopular master of the White House; they also had to find a leader who could lead the party to victory. They could not find one, just as they could not find any slogans that could compete, in terms of simplicity and appeal to the politically inexperienced voter, with the tax cut proposed by the Republicans.

The Democrats recognized the need for change. "For a long time, we have been coasting on past momentum," liberal Democratic Senator P. Tsongas said, "but our strength is running out. We must find something new; otherwise, we simply will not be able to survive." The attempts of Democrats in the House of Representatives to find a new route and form a so-called new conservative coalition ended in failure: Their ideas were amazingly similar to the conservative platform of the Republicans.

American analysts have tried to foresee the effects of the regrouping of political forces as a result of the election, and are talking about the erosion of the "New Deal" coalition, whose place will be taken by a new group--the "silent majority," representing "middle America." Nixon also tried to set up this kind of coalition. His attempts were resolutely resisted by Congress, where the Democrats held the majority in both houses, and ended with Watergate. The new correlation of forces, with which Reagan will have to work, is more favorable to the Republicans because the administration will have the support of the Senate. The Democrats will have to simply wait until the voters become disillusioned and lose faith in the oversimplified ideas of the Republicans. "It took a Hoover," the abovementioned P. Tsongas remarked, "to produce a Roosevelt."

Here are the changes in the personnel of both houses of Congress.

In the Senate elections, the following were defeated and were not reelected: Democrats G. McGovern (South Dakota), B. Bayh (Indiana), W. Magnuson (Washington), G. Nelson (Wisconsin), J. Durkin (New Hampshire), M. Gravel (Alaska), R. Morgan (North Carolina) and the previously mentioned J. Culver and F. Church, as well as Republican J. Javits (New York). Three southern Democrats were defeated: H. Talmadge (Georgia), who was unseated by Republican M. Mattingly; R. Stone (Florida), whose seat will be occupied by a second woman senator, P. Hawkins; and D. Stewart (Alabama), who lost to J. Denton, retired admiral and former prisoner-of-war in Vietnam. This is the first time since the Civil War that Alabama will be represented by a Republican.

Five senators retired: Republicans R. Schweiker (Pennsylvania), H. Bellmon (Oklahoma) and M. Young (North Dakota), and Democrats A. Ribicoff (Connecticut) and A. Stevenson (Illinois). Their respective seats will be taken by Republicans A. Specter, D. Nickles and M. Andrews, and Democrats C. Dodd and A. Dickson.

The blow suffered by the liberal wing of the Senate was particularly severe because each departing liberal was replaced by a legislator with conservative views. These are the previously mentioned C. Grassley and S. Symms, J. Abdnor, who defeated G. McGovern in South Dakota, D. Quayle, who triumphed over B. Bayh in Indiana, and R. Kasten, who defeated G. Nelson in Wisconsin.

The transfer of the Senate majority to the Republicans will mean a complete change of leadership in Senate committees and subcommittees. According to preliminary forecasts, Republican C. Percy from Illinois will head the Committee on Foreign Relations after Church's departure, and Republican S. Thurmond from South Carolina, who once vigorously opposed civil rights legislation, will replace Senator E. Kennedy as chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary. Senator J. Tower from Texas, who supports higher defense spending and opposes SALT II, will head the Senate Committee on the Armed Services. Senator J. Garn from Utah is destined to head the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Senator R. Dale from Kansas is one of the contenders for the post of Finance Committee chairman (in place of Democrat R. Long from Louisiana, who will now become the ranking Democrat in this committee). All of the candidates listed represent the Republican Party.

In the House of Representatives, just as in the Senate, around 60 targets were marked for attack by conservatives in the last campaign. They included the leader

of the Democratic faction--Speaker T. O'Neill (Massachusetts), Majority Leader J. Wright (Texas) and Majority Whip J. Brademas (Indiana), and heads of committees: A. Ullman (Oregon)--Ways and Means Committee, M. Udall (Arizona)--Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, F. Thompson (New Jersey)--Committee on House Administration, H. Johnson (California)--Committee on Public Works and Transportation, N. Smith (Iowa)--Committee on Small Business. As a result of the elections, 22 of the 60 marked "victims" were defeated, including J. Brademas, A. Ullman, F. Thompson, H. Johnson and others. Nonetheless, the liberal wing in the House of Representatives suffered much less than the liberals in the Senate. This is partially due to the congressmen's closer contacts with their districts, in contrast to the senators, who represent entire states.

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THE UPSWING IN THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 61-70

[Article by I. I. Aleksandrova and Yu. V. Kurenkov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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**CONGRESS AND THE VANCE-MACHENRY 'MISTAKE'**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 71-75**

**[Article by O. A. Kolobov]**

**[Not translated by JPRS]**

**CSO: 1803**

## THE 96th CONGRESS. SUMMING UP

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 75-79

[Exclusive report for our magazine by TASS correspondent Yu. S. Levchenko]

[Text] The American election of 4 November made significant changes in the alignment of political forces in Congress, the nation's highest legislative body. The election considerably strengthened the position of the Republican Party--or, more precisely, of its more conservative wing.

Most of the correspondents here view the election results as clear evidence that the U.S. political spectrum has shifted to the right and that a more important role in the ruling elite will now be played by conservative elements, who will attempt to solve the difficult problems facing the largest power in the capitalist world with a tougher domestic and foreign policy. Some correspondents have gone even further in their assessments of the significance of the "coup on Capitol Hill," viewing the Republican triumph as a significant shift in the prevailing current in the United States.

For example, University of California Professor Robert Kelly believes that the "changing of the guard" in the Senate signifies nothing other than the collapse of the entire bourgeois liberal outlook, engendered by Roosevelt's "New Deal" and preached by the Democratic Party in recent decades; Kelly sees this as the beginning of a new and lengthy era of the reign of neoconservative ideology, which will bring about profound and lasting changes in American society. In an article in the NEW YORK TIMES, he states that such profound shifts, which give a considerable advantage to one of the two dominant parties in the United States, occur at times of severe crises, which break out in the nation every 30-40 years. The last such shift, in his opinion, took place in the 1930's on the crest of the "Great Depression," when the Democratic Party began to play a dominant role in American politics. The 1980 election, according to Kelly, was the latest "critical turning point," which promises "extremely prolonged domination by the conservative ideology" in the United States.

Naturally, the growth of conservative feelings was not sudden. It was engineered behind the scenes by the entire policy of U.S. ruling circles, which have been waging a purposeful and coordinated campaign for many years to influence public opinion with the aim of overcoming the "post-Vietnam syndrome," undermining detente, stimulating military hysteria and escalating the arms race. The goal of this campaign is a maximally favorable climate for a return to power politics, to

imperialist expansion abroad and to "tighter control" within the nation. The campaign reached its peak at the time of the 96th Congress (1979-1980). This naturally left its imprint on the work of this session and strengthened tendencies benefiting rightist forces. These same tendencies then gave the Republican Party an impressive victory on 4 November.

The growth of conservative feelings was particularly apparent in the foreign policy decisions of the Congress. Fear of the change in the global balance of power in favor of socialism and of the growing struggle of people in the developing countries for economic independence, the deterioration of imperialism's positions and the collapse of the hope of using the policy of detente to undermine the socialist community from within--all of this became the nutritive medium for the spread of conservative views in the top ruling echelon of the United States.

The extraordinary belligerence of Congress was apparent from the very first days of the session and it remained characteristic of the overwhelming majority of its foreign policy and military decisions. Above all, this was reflected in discussions of Pentagon annual budgets. Not only did the last Congress fail to "put the brakes on" when military expenditures kept rising; it actually served as an "accelerator" of Pentagon requests. When the U.S. defense budget for fiscal year 1980 was discussed, Congress added billions of dollars to the administration's request, bringing the Pentagon budget up to a record high.

Congress also supplemented the administration's request for appropriations for the U.S. military establishment in fiscal year 1981, setting a new record. What is more, in several cases it was precisely the Congress that initiated the escalation of the arms race and its extension to new and dangerous frontiers. The Senate insisted on giving the Pentagon the funds to continue work on the new ultrasonic B-1 bomber, which the Carter Administration is known to have turned down in favor of the cruise missile. The Senate also allocated a total of 15 billion dollars to the Pentagon over the next few years for intensive work to extend the arms race to outer space--the development of laser weapons, the use of high-energy particles for military purposes, and so forth. When the defense budget for fiscal year 1981 was being discussed, the House of Representatives insisted on allocating funds for the construction of a binary nerve gas plant and for the considerable expansion of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Both houses of Congress supplemented the administration's request for funds for the Navy and Air Force and for the augmentation of the nuclear arsenal.

Through the efforts of agents of the military-industrial complex, Congress became one of the strongholds of the fight against the ratification of the Soviet-American SALT II treaty, envisaging effective steps to limit the arms race. The Senate Committee on the Armed Services, also known as the "Pentagon's Capitol Hill Branch," usurped the right of preliminary discussion of the treaty, although by law it does not have any relation to the ratification of important international documents. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which customarily takes a more realistic stand, the proteges of reactionary forces tried to undermine the ratification process by stirring up all of the provocative commotion of last summer over the alleged presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. This provocation was initiated by the Carter Administration and by the reactionary senator from Florida, R. Stone (who was, incidentally, defeated in the election). The militarists' bait attracted even a man as moderate in his views as Democrat F. Church, then chairman



of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. As a result, the discussion of the SALT II treaty in this committee was unconscionably dragged out, and the propitious moment for its ratification in the Senate was lost.

In fall 1979 the "hawks" from the Senate Committee on the Armed Services, headed by H. Jackson, the "Senator from Boeing," recommended that the SALT II treaty be rejected on the grounds that it allegedly endangers U.S. national security and offers advantages to the Soviet Union. This announcement was made at the time when the Carter Administration intensified its campaign for the deployment of the new American nuclear weapon in Western Europe and announced the plan to create a "rapid deployment force" and to increase military spending dramatically. Commenting on the committee's move, one journalist close to ruling circles maliciously remarked that it "pounded the last nail into the SALT II coffin."

The Pentagon's proteges in Congress did not conceal their desire to use the discussion of the SALT II treaty in the Senate not to promote the establishment of control over weapons, but to, in the words of one cold war ideologist, W. Rostow, stimulate nationwide discussion of the state of U.S. defensive strength, which would "reveal the flaws" in the nation's military preparedness and, we should add, would touch off a new round in the arms race. It was no coincidence that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's support for the treaty was made conditional upon a sharp increase in military spending. Pentagon lobbyists and senators like H. Jackson energetically egged the administration on, urging it to raise the minimum increase in real military expenditures to 5 percent a year instead of simply consenting to the proposed increase of 3 percent a year with an inflation clause. When the treaty was discussed in the Committee on Foreign Relations, it became absolutely clear that reactionary forces in the United States were cynically viewing the arms race as one way of artificially decelerating the economic development of the Soviet Union for the purpose of weakening its position in economic competition with capitalism.

By the end of 1979, the seeds of mistrust and hostility toward the Soviet Union and the policy of detente, which had been sown by rightist circles, led to an even more pronounced rightward shift in attitudes in the highest legislative body of the United States and created a maximally favorable climate for the Carter Administration's abrupt move toward confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Congress not only supported the White House's anti-Soviet campaign of unprecedented dimensions and all of the "sanctions" declared by the President against the USSR, but went even further than the administration in many cases, stopping just short of insisting on the complete cessation of all Soviet-American contacts and relations. Several hearings on the "Soviet threat" were held in various congressional committees in the beginning of 1980 to demonstrate the indemonstrable--the "destructive effect" of Soviet-American cooperation in the trade, economic, scientific and cultural spheres. Legislators whipped up the anti-Soviet campaign over human rights to the point of hysteria and unconditionally supported the administration in its renunciation of the policy of "balanced relations" with the USSR and China in favor of the rapid development of American-Chinese military cooperation on an anti-Soviet basis.

The Congress speedily approved all administration requests for appropriations for the immediate creation of a "rapid deployment force," the concentration of U.S. naval forces near the Persian Gulf and the acquisition of access to the military facilities of a number of African and Asian countries.

The anti-Soviet commotion died down somewhat in the summer and early fall of 1980, when it became obvious that the Carter Administration's sanctions had primarily harmed the interests of the United States, particularly the American farmers, who had lost their access to a stable guaranteed market. Growing dissatisfaction with Washington's lack of foresight forced Republican Party leaders to officially advocate the cancellation of restrictions on sales of grain to the Soviet Union. This proposal won Senate approval.

Incapable of simultaneously providing Americans with "guns and butter," for the last 2 years the Congress has invariably supported the administration's line of cutting social programs for a sake of a balanced budget and the fight against inflation. When the draft federal budget for fiscal year 1981 was being discussed, Congress made cuts in funds for the resolution of such urgent domestic problems as unemployment, urban crisis, public health systems and education, totaling 16 billion dollars. It buried a bill on the creation of a national medical insurance system, which would guaranteed minimum health care to the 18 million Americans who, according to Senator E. Kennedy, are presently not covered by any kind of health insurance. Considerable cuts were made in undertakings of such vital importance to millions of Americans as the job program for unemployed youth, welfare programs and food assistance programs for 24 million Americans whose standard of living, according to official data, "does not even come close" to the official U.S. poverty level.

On the other hand, the legislators did not count the dollars when the discussion turned to new privileges for monopolies. Giving in to the powerful lobby of the business community, the Congress totally changed the appearance of the administration's widely publicized program to end the energy crisis in the United States, turning it into a source of superprofits for the monopolies. The "triple energy program" approved by the legislators will guarantee big business, primarily the oil monopolies, up to 1 trillion dollars in additional profits in the next 5 years and will pump billions of dollars out of the taxpayers' pockets to pay for the accelerated development of alternative sources of energy.

The Carter Administration's measures to strengthen monopoly power over the American economy also won full congressional support. The session agreed to the cancellation of federal control over airlines and railroads. Considering the previously approved "deregulation" of the motor transport business, virtually the entire transportation system in the United States has now been turned over to the monopolies.

Pushing through these measures under the banner of "free enterprise," the congressmen and senators instantly forgot about the appeals to "give market forces free rein" when huge sums from the federal treasury had to be awarded to monopolies that were on the verge of bankruptcy as a result of their own lack of foresight. For example, last year the Congress allocated more than 3.5 billion dollars to an automotive concern--and one of the Pentagon's largest contractors in the production of tanks and armored troop carriers--Chrysler, which was on the verge of collapse because it had stubbornly persisted in producing heavy and uneconomical limousines that were no longer in demand after the energy crisis started. According to the NEW YORK TIMES, this decision clearly demonstrated that "big corporations, no matter how extravagant and unproductive they have been, can always count on Washington to give them a helping hand."

Foreseeing the growth of social protest in the nation in connection with the overtly pro-monopolistic policy of the authorities, conservative circles in the Congress are concerning themselves in advance with "tightening control" within the nation and are giving police and the punitive machine a free hand in the suppression of protest demonstrations and the "protection of law and order." One of the most reactionary of these measures is the so-called reform of criminal law. For several years now, great pains have been taken to push this reform through Congress. Although the reform is supposed to introduce order into the truly archaic system of justice in the United States, it is literally bursting with provisions which will sharply expand the powers of police, judges, the FBI and other special bodies engaged in the investigation of progressive organizations, and impose rigid restrictions on the labor movement and on the freedoms of speech, the press and assembly. The reactionary purpose of this proposed legislation has aroused opposition in the broadest segments of the American public, under whose pressure the legislators have had to restrain themselves from approving the legislation for a long time. However, it has invariably "revived" in slightly modified form. No one here doubts that this "reform" will be resurrected in this latest Congress, the 97th, and that the more conservative tenor of this session will almost certainly guarantee its adoption.

Rightist forces in the Congress are making every effort to get their own way by hook or by crook. They are enacting their favorite laws by "attaching" the appropriate amendments to financial bills. In particular, the 96th Congress approved an amendment to a bill on appropriations for CIA needs, which will relieve this body of the restrictions imposed on it in the wake of the exposure of the illegal activities of the "intelligence community" in the mid-1970's. In essence, the CIA has been given a green light for the virtually unrestricted conduct of so-called "secret operations"--subversive activity within the United States and abroad. This amendment, which has become law, invests the CIA with the right to not only plan and conduct such operations, but also to conceal its most questionable activities from the public and the Congress.

The rightward shift in the 96th Congress was also reflected in increasingly vigorous attacks on the elementary democratic rights of American citizens, particularly blacks, who won certain concessions from ruling circles as a result of the massive movement for equal rights in the 1960's. Conservative congressmen added eight amendments to various financial bills, which will actually repeal the most important provisions of the law on civil rights regarding the eradication of the most flagrant forms of racism and racial discrimination in the educational system, in employment and in housing. Several of these amendments were approved by the Senate at its final meetings after the election on 4 November. Renowned activist in the black movement J. Jackson called these decisions "part of a mounting offensive by racists, including the Ku Klux Klan and other extremist groups."

The American public viewed the decisions of the 96th Congress in this area as additional evidence of the hypocrisy of U.S. ruling circles, which, to the accompaniment of the campaign focusing on imaginary violations of human rights in the socialist countries, are constantly chipping away at the already limited socio-economic and political rights of millions of citizens in their own country.

The 1980 election, which led the Republican Party candidate to the White House and guaranteed the Republicans control in the Senate, overjoyed conservatives, who are

now concentrating on pumping the wave of conservatism in the nation even higher and implying that the Republican victory falls just short of a "mandate" for the continued dramatic escalation of military spending and an even broader attack on the gains achieved by workers in many years of class struggle. Rightist forces in the Congress have already specified the new measures that will be given primary attention in coming sessions. They include the augmentation of the Pentagon budget by another 13-18 billion dollars, with a subsequent increase of 35 billion a year for the next 5 years (this is the recommendation of the conservative "brain trust"--the Heritage Foundation). The recommended measures include cuts in pay for construction workers employed in federal projects and the cancellation of the minimum wage for adolescents.

In spite of all this, the Republican Party victory does not give the neoconservatives a "popular mandate" to turn the U.S. ship of state even further to the right, as their ideologists are now implying. A public opinion poll conducted jointly by CBS Broadcasting and the NEW YORK TIMES indicated that the majority of Americans feel that the outcome of the 4 November election was predetermined primarily by the foreign and domestic policy failures of the Democrats. In particular, CBS stressed that the election results "do not in any way indicate that the American people support the views of the right wing" of the Republican Party.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 'SOVIET THREAT': DOMESTIC SOURCES OF THE COLD WAR  
CONSENSUS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 80-89

[Conclusion of abridgement by V. I. Bogachev of the book "The Rise and Fall of the  
'Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus" by Alan Wolfe, Arms  
Control Association, Washington, 1980]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

CHEMICAL WASTE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 90-101

[Article by M. M. Shapiro]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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NASA: MANAGEMENT ASPECTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 102-109

[Article by A. A. Vasil'yev]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

## BOOK REVIEWS

### National Priorities in the Coming Decade

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 110-112

[Review by P. T. Podlesnyy of the book "Setting National Priorities. Agenda for the 1980's," edited by J. Pechman, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1980, XIII + 563 pages]

[Text] This latest study by the Brookings Institution is interesting for at least two reasons. First of all, this is one of the few works published in the United States in which the authors attempt a comprehensive investigation of the most urgent domestic and foreign policy problems of the coming decade. Secondly, the work has been prepared by a prestigious and influential group of researchers, whose viewpoint is indicative of the present attitudes of American political and academic circles.

We should immediately point out that the Brookings study as a whole does not introduce any changes into the interpretation of U.S. foreign policy strategy for the 1980's, and the basic ideas set forth in this study differ little from the trends in U.S. policy which became particularly apparent under the Carter Administration. At the same time, some of the nuances and stresses in the study deserve critical examination.

The authors admit that American foreign policy prospects, basic guidelines and priorities for the 1980's will depend largely on such objective factors as the serious economic difficulties which could increase social dissatisfaction in the nation and the further spread of mistrust in government institutions by the U.S. public. The authors point out the growing dependence of the American economy on imports of some types of raw materials and energy resources; the increasing significance of the developing countries for U.S. political, economic and military interests; and the tendency toward the exacerbation of conflicts, primarily in the economic sphere, with other leading capitalist countries. As pointed out in the introduction to the work, the United States must take these factors into account and make a new effort to prevent the further deterioration of its world positions and deflect the threats to American capitalism. The authors have not lost sight of the importance of the "China factor" to the United States, with the aid of which pressure can be exerted on the Soviet Union.



According to the authors of this study, in the 1980's the United States should give special attention to the new buildup of military strength as a key instrument of its foreign policy strategy. The role of military strength in the full variety of means and instruments of American policy is examined in the chapter entitled "Military Policy," written by W. Kaufmann, renowned expert on military policy. The author has no objections, in principle, to the general purpose and content of Washington's new 5-year (1981-1985) military program, which is known to specify an annual real increase of approximately 4.6 percent in military spending, the modernization of strategic weapons, the development of new types of medium-range nuclear weapons, the creation of a "rapid deployment force" and more extensive military research. Kaufmann does, however, question both the expediency and the wisdom of U.S. attempts to regain superiority to the USSR in the area of strategic arms. "When we examine strategic or tactical nuclear means of deterrence," he writes, "to the degree that they are unconnected with one another, we can say that the attempts to gain nuclear superiority to a sufficiently competent and persistent adversary are useless and wasteful. It would be better to set a more modest and reasonable goal--that is, to preserve the state of impasse in the field of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and to use resources for the attainment of other, more urgent objectives" (p 295). The author is just as reserved in his views on all of the assertions that the United States "does not measure up" to the USSR in the military sphere, stressing that "the United States is not in any sense a military pygmy" (p 315).

These remarks by the author, which clearly display elements of realism, do not mean that Kaufmann favors any kind of significant steps toward the limitation of the arms race. All of his subsequent discussion can essentially be summarized as an appeal to the American leadership for concentration on the expansion and reinforcement of the potential of American general-purpose armed forces to the point at which the United States will be able to simultaneously participate in one major conflict and several minor ones in different parts of the world (p 314). In other words, he advocates the further augmentation of potential for U.S. armed intervention in the affairs of other countries, especially the developing states, and on a broader scale than planned and carried out by the present administration. In this connection, Kaufmann favors a further increase in military expenditures on the creation of a "rapid deployment force" and the expansion of the American military presence in such important--from the standpoint of American imperialist interests--regions as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The author not only advises broader military cooperation with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Oman and Somalia, but also stresses "the importance of acquiring potential for direct local intervention by the United States, acquiring access to air force and naval facilities (in the abovementioned countries--P. P.) and, if possible, establishing real military bases" (p 19).

An acquaintance with the work will prove that these conclusions are based on Washington theoreticians' worries about the probability of further political change in the 1980's that might be inconsistent with U.S. interests and aims and might undermine U.S. world positions, especially in the developing countries, which are increasingly important to the United States. "The developing countries," this study notes, "supply the United States with around 40 percent of all the oil it uses, as well as large quantities of other important commodities. The countries that have progressed the most in their industrial development often penetrate the markets of the developed countries (of the West--P. P.) by means of imports of such

consumer goods as textiles, footwear, household computer equipment, and clothing, the production of which does not require large expenditures. Approximately two-fifths of all American exports go to the developing countries--more than the combined quantities sent to Eastern and Western Europe, the USSR and China. The developing countries represent the most rapidly expanding market for sales of American machines, transport equipment, high technology goods, technical services and agricultural commodities. American banks and corporations also have large investments in the developing countries. Besides this, these countries are of strategic interest to the United States as a form of access to crude resources and commodities and the protection of communication lines" (p 450). Military strength will be the medium that will aid most directly in the economic and political penetration of the developing countries by the United States. "Military strength," Kaufmann writes, "is not a panacea, and it cannot solve all of the problems that are likely to arise in the decade. But it will make other U.S. actions more convincing. It can strengthen the trust of allies and heighten the hesitation of adversaries.... Military strength will give the United States opportunities and time for the use of the other means on which it prefers to rely--namely, diplomatic, economic, international legal, and administrative. Without military force, it is not likely that anything else will produce significant results" (pp 292-293, 315).

This makes us wonder if the clarifications proposed by W. Kaufmann and other authors for present foreign policy strategy are just a more clever way of defending the interests of American imperialism. The authors' appeals for interventionist actions by the United States in various parts of the world could only threaten world peace, not to mention their complete lack of agreement with the authors' own statements about the need to "respect the legitimate interests of Soviet security" (p 315).

The future development of Soviet-American relations is analyzed in the chapter entitled "The Soviet Challenge," written by H. Sonnenfeldt, who was one of H. Kissinger's advisers in 1968-1976. This chapter conveys the most contradictory messages.

On the one hand, the author believes that relations with the Soviet Union, just as in past decades, will continue to occupy a central position in American foreign policy and strategy. "For the United States," Sonnenfeldt writes, "the main problem of the 1980's will remain the regulation of relations with the Soviet Union for the purpose of preventing war and avoiding the restriction of American interests" (p 359). Sonnenfeldt substantiates this view of the future relations between the two countries with the USSR's increasing ability to influence political events in various parts of the world. He feels that the USSR and the United States will remain the leading military powers in the world until the end of the century. Discussing the nature of Soviet-American relations, the author writes: "The tendency to view these relations in the form of such extreme alternatives as competition or cooperation will almost certainly lead to errors. It would be more correct to approach these relations as a comprehensive phenomenon with a multitude of different aspects. The Americans will be doing themselves a disservice if they strive for complete clarity in interrelations with the Soviet Union.... Any state of relations other than war can contain some degree of hostility at a certain stage.... Cooperation should be regarded as part of the process of regulating competition" (p 363).

At the same time, Sonnenfeldt openly advocates a tough line toward the USSR in the 1980's. The United States, he writes, "must define its interests more precisely than in past years and conduct a conscious policy aimed at guarding these interests against Soviet encroachment. The United States must act in conjunction with other countries with similar or identical interests and concerns. In the broader context, the United States must gain a clearer understanding of the interaction of various elements of its policy toward the USSR" (p 21).

The author's position regarding the prospects for interaction by the two countries in the field of arms race limitation is just as contradictory. Although he does not exclude the possibility that agreements will be reached on some aspects (the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the strengthening of military confidence measures in Europe, and so forth), he states an extremely reserved opinion in regard to the possibility of agreements in other, more important spheres. "The next few years," Sonnenfeldt believes, "are not likely to be productive from the standpoint of results in the SALT talks or in the establishment of control over the arms race in Europe" (p 377).

An analysis of some of the issues discussed in the Brookings study leads to the general conclusion that these authors' ideas and proposals regarding U.S. foreign policy in the 1980's are colored by the expansionist desire of Washington theoreticians to acquire maximum strength and broader influence for the United States in the world.

#### The CIA: Praise and Criticism

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 112-115

[Review by Yu. A. Shvedkov of the books "Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA" by William Colby and Peter Forbath, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1978; "The Man Who Kept the Secrets; Richard Helms and the CIA" by Thomas Powers, New York, Knopf, 1980; "In Search of Enemies" by John Stockwell, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1978; "Cry of the People" by Penny Lernaux, New York, Doubleday, 1980]

[Text] When Washington ruling circles resolved to conduct a tougher foreign policy, one of their first objectives was to strengthen the American special services, cancelling even the few restrictions that had been imposed on their activity after the scandalous exposures of the mid-1970's. Today various bills, aimed at the moral rehabilitation of the intelligence community and its judicial reinforcement, are being discussed under the Capitol dome.

However, echoes of the severe moral blow dealt to U.S. intelligence services by the Watergate scandal and the exposure of their sinister, illegal activities within the nation and abroad are still tormenting the guilty conscience of many Americans, including some intelligence veterans. This is attested to by the publication of articles and books in the United States, whose authors, persons closely connected with the CIA in the past, are pointedly criticizing the work of the American special services. We could say that the book market in the United States has become a kind of battlefield: The flow of criticism is colliding with the cross-current of literature which attempts to vindicate American intelligence methods.



The line of the CIA leadership in this conflict is extremely unequivocal: It can be judged from two recently published books about the activities of such odious men as R. Helms and W. Colby, who headed the CIA in the late 1960's and early 1970's--that is, precisely at the time when the abuses that were later exposed were being committed.

The first of these books, published in 1980 and entitled "The Man Who Kept the Secrets; Richard Helms and the CIA," was written by little-known researcher T. Powers. He depicts the CIA director as a wise official, tortured by doubts and objections when plans are made to assassinate foreign statesmen or to send U.S. mercenaries to other parts of the world, which he had to do on direct orders from the White House. It turns out, however, that Helms kept his doubts to himself and decided not to contradict his superiors. Publicly, he calmly denied the existence of abuses in CIA activity and asserted that "the nation will just have to take our word for it that we are also decent people." This is how the author describes the nobility of the CIA director.

The other book, the pompous memoirs of Colby, was written somewhat earlier with the aid of journalist P. Forbath. The title of this book unequivocally indicates how Colby sees himself. Colby's main thesis is that, from the time he was appointed CIA director, he began to take steps to prevent abuses within the work of the agency, and when Congress began its series of investigations, he supposedly went against Kissinger's advice and cooperated completely with the American legislators, giving them all the information they needed.

The inescapable conclusion is obvious: The responsibility for the abuses committed by the CIA must be shouldered by statesmen of the past, but now this lawlessness has been stopped, all subversive operations against foreign states have ceased and the respectability of the CIA has been restored.

To the considerable displeasure of the CIA leadership, however, this picture does not agree at all with the convincing testimony of other authors, former intelligence agents who are well aware of the state of affairs in the American intelligence community. Their books include, for example, works which made a big splash in the publishing market: "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by V. Marchetti and J. Marks, "Inside the Company. CIA Diary" by P. Agee, "In Search of Enemies" by J. Stockwell, "The Cry of the People" by Penny Lernaux and several others. All of these books were written by different people and from different vantage points, but their authors have one thing in common: They do not want to take the explanations of the CIA leadership on faith and they maintain that this agency is still violating the universally accepted standards of international law and morality by undertaking dangerous subversive operations against other states, which could threaten peace and security throughout the world.

The critics of the CIA assert that its leadership is still giving false testimony about the nature of agency activities. This systematic misinformation about U.S. intelligence practices, as even Colby had to admit, is one of the reasons for the moral shock suffered by many agency employees. He says in his book that "employees were enraged by the fact that the accusations of CIA abuses, which they had loyally denied for several years, were now acknowledged to be true" (p 412). Colby implies, however, that all of this is in the past.



The book by John Stockwell, who led a CIA task force in Angola, resolutely refutes all attempts to whitewash the Central Intelligence Agency. Stockwell writes that the CIA leadership constantly and deliberately gave false testimony about agency activity not only to the American Congress, but even to the inter-departmental "Committee of 40," created within the U.S. National Security Council to approve secret subversive intelligence operations. "Under the supervision of the CIA director," he says, "we lied to the Congress and the Committee of 40" (p 10). It is indicative that this practice was continued even when the Congress was investigating CIA activity in 1975. In reference to Colby's "interaction" with the Congress, Stockwell clarifies the point: "He systematically misinformed the congressmen about our actions in Angola" (p 229). For example, according to Stockwell's testimony, Colby denied in Congress that American mercenaries were involved in military actions in Angola, but the State Department soon had to acknowledge this fact.

In her book, P. Lernaux exposes the CIA practice of using American missionaries and the Catholic Church for subversive work in the Latin American countries. What is more, the author calls Colby's statement that the missionaries' connection with the CIA did not affect the "purity of their mission" a deliberate and ridiculous lie. There is, the author stresses, ample evidence that the CIA used religious groups in Latin America for its own secret purposes.

The critics of the CIA completely refute Colby's data about the alleged curtailment of secret operations by American special services against other states. John Stockwell, for example, stresses that President Ford, who conducted a so-called reorganization of the leading intelligence agencies in 1974, "expanded the CIA charter, granting it the power to intervene even in the affairs of countries that maintain friendly relations with the United States and countries that are not threatened by internal subversive activity" (p 253). President Carter, according to Stockwell, continued the reorganization of intelligence agencies, proceeding "from the assumption that the secret services are important to our national security" and "did not reduce" the scales of CIA operations (p 254).

The validity of this information is attested to by the tremendous growth of the American intelligence community's annual budget. At the beginning of the 1970's it totaled, according to various American sources, 6-8 billion dollars. A large part of the budget was earmarked for the financing of secret subversive operations. By the end of the 1970's, the total budget of the American intelligence community reached, according to P. Agee, 23 billion dollars a year.

Finally, all of the CIA's critics agree in general that the secret CIA subversive operations do not promote the actual security interests of the United States and, in fact, often run contrary to these interests by helping to create dangerous crisis situations in various parts of the world. Agee draws the most sweeping conclusions in this connection. He writes that considerations of "national security" are used to conceal the desire of the U.S. ruling class to preserve and consolidate American imperialism's influence in various parts of the world.

The CIA leadership is in a position in which it cannot deny the facts cited by its critics. It is making every attempt, however, to shut them up. The most diverse means are being used for this purpose--from the establishment of a special

censorship board within the CIA to the institution of court proceedings against those who continue to expose unscrupulous CIA methods. P. Agee, who now lives in England, is even in danger of losing his American passport.

The American press recently published reports that the publication of several papers had been prohibited by a censorship board that has been operating as part of the CIA since 1976. Now this board is trying to prevent the publication of at least two manuscripts that have already been sent to the printer. These are works by former intelligence service employees P. Snapp and W. Eveland. Both of them contain a pointedly critical analysis of the activities of the CIA leadership in various parts of the world. The CIA is trying to "neutralize" these books by excising the sharpest criticism on the pretext that certain passages contain classified information.

Voices in the American press are already asserting, however, that the point of all this is not the secrecy of the information. The cuts made by the CIA in the book by V. Marchetti and J. Marks proved that the intelligence leadership is disturbed less by the publication of classified data than by information that could compromise the decisions made by the administration and the CIA.

#### The Neoconservative Trend

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 115-117

[Review by S. M. Samuylov of the book "The Neoconservatives. The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics" by Peter Steinfels, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1979, 321 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

#### The Democratic Party: Voters and Policies

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 117-118

[Review by N. N. Glagolev of the book "Demokraticheskaya partiya SShA: izbirateli i politika" by V. O. Pechatnov, Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 248 pages]

[Text] This monograph, published during the year of the presidential election in the United States, continues the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies' examination of the two-party political machine of American imperialism, the ideology and policy of the two largest bourgeois parties in the United States and the differences between their methods of guaranteeing political control over the masses by ruling circles.

The new features of this work primarily include its discussion of the natural laws governing party policymaking as a result of a complex process of interaction by the party electorate and politicians, in this case the electorate and politicians of the Democratic Party. The vantage point of Pechatnov's investigation is made all the more important by the fact that it is precisely on the level of this interaction that the party system performs its main function as the chief connecting link between ruling circles and social forces.

In this connection, the first chapter of the book is of particular interest. Here, the author presents abundant factual material and many previously unpublished papers from various U.S. archives to demonstrate how the strategy of social manipulation originated in the 1930's and has been developed ever since. Party history of the 1930's and 1940's shows how the liberal Democratic leadership managed to retain the dominant position in F. Roosevelt's broad New Deal coalition and to keep its basic elements within its sphere of influence. For the liberals, the New Deal became a permanent model of the successful use of social protest by the bourgeoisie for its own purposes. And conversely, according to rightist conservative critics, it marked the establishment of the Democratic Party's strong tradition of demagogically "playing up to the masses," a practice which could shake the very foundations of the entire capitalist political system. Subsequent years, V. Pechatnov stresses, introduced many changes into the policy and mass base of the Democrats, but the basic features of the "party of the common people" and of "reform and progress" were retained and were developed even further (p 41).

In a discussion of the events of subsequent years, the author traces the Democratic Party leadership's line of drawing mass opposition movements--the black civil rights movement and the youth and antiwar movements--into its sphere of influence.

For the first time in Soviet academic literature, V. Pechatnov examines Democratic foreign policy in light of the influence of party political doctrine. The author singles out several elements of Democratic political doctrine and style. Above all, these include a high degree of activism and attempts to redirect the process of social change in the world into channels necessary for the ruling class. According to Democratic doctrine, the chief instrument of this kind of intervention is the bourgeois state itself.

Pechatnov distinguishes between two main currents among the diverse forms taken by this activism--the reformist current and the current stressing military force. Almost all of the basic foreign policy initiatives of the reformist type in the United States, beginning with W. Wilson's 14 Points, F. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and J. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and ending with J. Carter's reformist maneuvers in the developing world, belong to the Democrats (p 100).

The specific features of the current emphasizing military force are less obvious. On the whole, the author writes, the Democrats are distinguished by the more interventionistic use of military force, which is related to their general line of more active intervention in the development of world processes, and in this sense military intervention is the militaristic twin of reformism, and the latter, in turn, can be regarded as a "peaceful," civilian form of intervention (p 102).

According to the author, this is the reason for the Democrats' search for flexibility in the use of military force.

The author also gives special attention to the totally unresearched sphere of the process by which alternative foreign policy lines mature. Due to the specific features of the two-party system in the United States, this process generally takes place within the opposition party. In the 1950's, when the Republican Eisenhower Administration was in power, the New Frontiers strategy, envisaging the dramatic energization of foreign policy activity in the most important areas, was worked out in the Democratic camp (pp 127-139); the military strategy of the 1970's, which

was also worked out at a time when the White House was occupied by Republicans--the Nixon and Ford administrations--proceeded from a recognition of the fact that the United States no longer possessed its previous strategic superiority. This is why it stressed the mobilization of non-military components of national strength and the more active competition by the systems in non-military fields. Subsequent Democratic policy corroborated, however, that this did not lead to the underestimation of military force. In essence, the Carter Administration resolved to combine detente in one of the central aspects of Soviet-American relations--strategic arms limitation--with attempts to exert pressure on the USSR in other areas (p 183).

Pechatnov's monograph, which is interesting in itself, will also serve as a great help in the thorough analysis of the reasons for the massive defeat suffered by the Democrats in the 1980 election, when they lost not only the White House but also many seats in Congress and state legislatures.

#### Partnership or Exploitation?

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 118-119

[Review by A. B. Parkanskiy of the book "Partnerstvo ili ekspluatatsiya?" by R. I. Zimenkov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, 118 pages]

[Text] The author reveals new forms and methods of imperialist economic expansion in the developing states. The export of capital by multinational corporations in the form of direct investments is the chief instrument for the exploitation of the liberated countries. In terms of direct private investments abroad, the United States surpasses all of the other capitalist states combined. Between 1965 and 1977 alone, direct capital investments by U.S. corporations in Asian, African and Latin American countries doubled and reached 33.7 billion dollars (p 5).

In today's world, the monopolies that once made every effort to impede the industrialization of economically underdeveloped states now have to accept some industrial development in the liberated countries and a new system of division of labor within the world capitalist economy. As the author points out, however, monopolistic capital is striving to redirect these processes into the channels it desires, relying on the strength of its assets and progressive technology (p 13). The multinational corporations are now cooperating with the upper echelon of the local bourgeoisie, establishing influential groups of their supporters in the economy and politics of the developing countries. These corporate "concessions" are recouped a hundredfold through the intense exploitation of the labor and natural resources of the young states: The flow of new private investments into the developing countries is now equivalent to only 30 percent of the profits taken out of them (p 26).

One of the principal means by which the multinational corporations penetrate the economies of young states is Western economic "aid," which can achieve sizeable proportions: It was valued at 85.7 billion dollars in the 1970-1977 period, and almost one-third of this sum was allocated by the United States. The purpose of this "aid," as the author writes, is to keep the recipients "attached" to the world capitalist economy. In particular, for each dollar of "aid," the recipient country spends eight times as much of its own funds, and this, as the author



correctly points out, means that imperialist states can direct large quantities of financial and material resources in the liberated countries into the particular economic sectors whose development will benefit the long-range interests of imperialism (p 32). The "aid" is also used for the exertion of political pressure on the young states.

A large part of the work is taken up by the disclosure of the actual policy of multinational corporations in the area of license trade with the developing countries and the cultivation of Western methods of management in their economies.

#### Outer Space and the Economy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 p 119

[Review by G. S. Khozin of the book "Kosmos i ekonomika" by I. I. Isachenko, Moscow, Mysl', 1979, 228 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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CSO: 1803

THE 500: CHANGES OVER A QUARTER-CENTURY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 120-125

[Article by N. A. Sakharov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1980)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 81 pp 126-127

[Not translated by JPRS]

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